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ABSTRACT
My dissertation consists of three chapters in the field of education finance. In the United
States, education is the joint responsibility of Federal, state, and local governments. I ex-
plore the interactions between these different sources of funds and examine how these
are affected by a variety of factors: immigration, policy changes, and education finance
reform. I study state and local government education budgeting decisions, and build eco-
nomic models that capture realities of public education financing when there are different
but interrelated sources of funding. I use empirical analysis on extensive data on school
district finances linked to demographics to evaluate the empirical implications of these
models, and develop comprehensive measures of tax adjustments in public education fi-
nance.
My first chapter offers an alternative interpretation of the negative relationship be-
tween immigration flows and changes in per-pupil spending in U.S. school districts. I
argue that fiscal channels are sufficient to explain the negative effect of immigration on
education funding and decompose the effect into separate responses at different levels of
government. Immigrants have lower incomes on average than natives, and so their immi-
gration increases the cost to natives of providing uniform education. I find that while state
contributions to education do not respond to immigration, local governments decrease
education revenues by 7.4 percent for every 1 percentage point increase in immigration,
or about $319 when evaluated at the 2007 average county education contribution. This
corresponds to an estimated elasticity of -0.43. Thus, median voter politics largely in-
sulate state governments from increases in the tax price of education in the presence of
immigration, but do not do so for local governments.
My second chapter estimates the impact of Federal grant expansions during the Great
Recession. During this period, the Federal government increased its contributions toward
K-12 education by about 50%. I use an instrumental variable approach to estimate the ef-
fect of these expanded Federal contributions on state and local district education finance,
focusing on the extent of crowd-out. I find that the fiscal response to increased Federal
funding is different at these two levels of government, and is dependent on the program
through which the additional funds are channeled. Funds from expanded existing pro-
grams like Title I and IDEA Special Education did not crowd out state and local district
education contributions. These grants increased total revenue dollar for dollar. In sharp
contrast, funds from the new State Fiscal Stabilization Fund completely crowded out state
education contributions, leaving local district contributions unaffected.
My third chapter investigates the crowding out of increased state education contribu-
tions on total education spending at the school district level and explores how the crowd-
out rate relates to the states choice of education funding system. Using an event study
framework, I find that different properties of education funding systems imply different
vii
levels of redistribution within-state. State finance systems with properties that encourage
equalization, like minimum foundation plans and spending limits, result in crowding-in
of education funds by state contributions. On the other hand, properties like equalization
plans and reward-for-effort plans result in crowding-out of funds.
viii
CHAPTER I
Immigration, Fiscal Federalism, and the Tax Price of
Education
1.1 Introduction
The U.S. has seen rapid growth in immigration since the Immigration and Natural-
ization Act of 1965 abolished immigration quotas, with the U.S. foreign-born population
increasing four-fold (and share increasing three-fold) from 1970 to 2013 (Figure 1.1). A
consequence of this growth is rising diversity in communities, which has been associated
with declining support for public goods provision, particularly for public education. Much
of the previous literature on this topic has focused on social mechanisms like ethnic frag-
mentation (Alesina et al. (1999), Dahlberg et al. (2012)), in-group biases (Coen-Pirani
(2011), Speciale (2012)) or cultural differences (Baldwin and Huber (2010)), but much
less studied is how changing fiscal burdens induced by immigration may be driving this
phenomenon.
In this paper, I argue that fiscal channels are sufficient to explain the negative effect
of immigration on education funding and decompose the effect into separate state and
local government responses. I develop a model that explicitly describes how immigration
changes the tax price of education, which is the amount of additional taxes that have to be
paid by the taxpayer in order to raise public education by $1. This change is not uniform
in the separate jurisdictions, which allows me to provide a quantitative measure of how
immigration impacts public education finance at different levels of government.
There are three major themes that emerge from this investigation. First, state and local
governments do not respond equally to immigration. In the U.S., the responsibility1 for
education funding is almost equally shared between state and local governments, which
face different tax bases and different incentives when setting taxes. Because money is
1About 90% of all education revenues in 2014 are attributed to state and local governments. The remain-
der is attributed to Federal sources. Source: NCES Digest of Education Statistics.
1
fungible, past analyses using current spending in education as the outcome variable are
unable to distinguish between these two responses. By focusing on education revenues
instead of spending, I am able to find a better measure of how governments respond to
immigration. Second, immigration into a district does not change the amount of per-pupil
state aid that the district receives. This is because median voter politics implies that the
choice of state contributions is made outside of the district, and that decision depends
only on the relative magnitude of median district2 income and mean state income. Third,
immigrants tend to be poorer than natives (Figure 1.2), and so immigration into a district
weakly increases the tax price of education which is the amount of taxes that has to be paid
to raise the funding of public education by $1. Because education is now more expensive,
the district reduces its per-pupil education funding contribution.
I model education spending as the solution to a two-stage optimization problem, which
reflects how education revenues are raised in the vast majority of states. At the state
level3, legislators decide on a minimum level of per-student education funding, called the
foundation grant. At the local district level, each of the districts in the state can choose to
augment the foundation grant by collecting local taxes subject to rules specified by state
legislation.
The model describes how state and local tax revenues change in response to changes
in immigration. The interaction between state and local governments’ funding decisions
have implications for their ability to respond to immigration. Because there is a single
state funding scheme, state legislators act to redistribute income within the state. The
model predicts that state education revenues allocated towards a particular district are
negatively related to district income, but are independent of the district’s immigrant share.
On the other hand, local districts set their own tax rates, and wealthier districts are less
constrained by the state minimum education requirement than poorer districts. The model
predicts that district education revenues are positively related to district income, and are
negatively correlated to immigration. Combining this with the observation that immigra-
tion decreases total education revenue leads to the result that the effect of immigration is
concentrated at the local district level.
My empirical analysis exploits variation at the county level using decennial data from
1990-2007 to show the long-run impact of changes in immigration on education finance.
Concerns about reverse causality due to Tiebout (1956) sorting or omitted variable bias are
addressed by using an instrumental variable that is the predicted change in the fraction of
2The median district I refer to here is the median voter for the purposes of determining state contributions
to education. Section 1.2 describes this in more detail.
3This describes how education funding works in most, but not all states. More details are provided in
Section 1.2
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foreign-born residents based on historical immigrant settlement patterns, as done in Card
(2001) and Wozniak and Murray (2012). The empirical analysis supports the theoretical
predictions of the model. I show that the previously downward decrease in education
spending that is associated with an increase in immigration into a district is due almost
entirely to a decrease in education revenue raised by the local school district. This can
be attributed to a substitution effect: immigrants to a district increase the local tax price
of education by more than the increase in the state tax price, and so raising funds for
education becomes relatively more expensive at the local level.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the prior literature
and the institutional background of U.S. public K-12 education finance. Section 1.3 intro-
duces the model set-up and describes the implications of the model. Section 1.4 describes
the data used to test the model implications. Section 1.5 and 1.6 present the empirical
framework and analysis. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Background
In this section, I describe the state of the literature on immigration and public educa-
tion provision, and provide an introduction to the institutional background of public K-12
education that informs the model set-up.
1.2.1 Prior literature
This paper is related to several strands of the literature on public goods. Specifically, it
relates to the extensive work on population demographics as determinants of government
spending on public goods. However, while this literature is extensive, in this paper I
focus on immigration and explore the fiscal mechanism of its impact on public education
finance. This paper is also unique in that it approaches this question from two perspectives,
a theoretical, model-driven approach and an empirical approach.
The literature on demographics and public good provision shows that there are low lev-
els of public good provision in heterogeneous and ethnically diverse societies. The seminal
paper by Alesina et al. (1999) finds that individuals’ willingness to contribute to public
goods depends on the racial composition of the community. In particular, the authors’
cross-sectional analysis shows that higher levels of racial fragmentation are associated
with lower spending. There are several different mechanisms that have been proposed to
explain this empirical result. Alesina and Ferrara (2005) describe in their review of the
literature that perhaps different ethnic groups may differ in their preferences for public
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goods, and so increased diversity results in an increased difficulty to agree on a common
public policy or a common level of public good provision.
Hoxby (2001) finds that at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level, increased
racial heterogeneity has a negative effect on education spending. La Ferrara and Mele
(2006) subsequently showed that there is increased racial segregation at the level of school
jurisdictions, implying that individuals are sorting within the MSA level into more racially
homogeneous districts. They also find that racial segregation has a positive effect on av-
erage per-pupil spending on education, but there is more inequality across districts in the
same MSA. A related paper is Urquiola (2005), which finds that as districts become more
racially distinct within MSAs, there is increased diversity in the levels of per-pupil spending
in these districts.
Changing demand for public good provision is also induced by the changing age distri-
bution as the baby boom population ages. Policymakers have long focused on the impact
of aging populations on Federally-funded programs like Social Security and Medicaid, but
state and local governments also have cause for concern. The literature suggests that the
elderly vote to support their own interests, and so as populations age, the shifting political
power from the working-age to the elderly could potentially lead to fewer resources being
allocated toward public goods targeted for children, including education. The most influ-
ential paper in this category is by Poterba (1998), who examined how intergenerational
conflict has affected states’ willingness to fund public education. He finds that a high pro-
portion of people over 65 in a state is associated with a lower amount of state spending on
public education. He also finds the negative relationship is more pronounced in the states
where older individuals are ethnically or racially different from those that are school-aged.
Ladd and Murray (2001) analyze the same relationship at the county level and find a much
smaller elasticity, due to more stringent controls to account for Tiebout bias. The elderly
tend to move to counties with fewer children, and so even if at the state level they have a
negative effect on education spending (the Poterba result), the effect is diminished at the
county level.
There is a growing literature on the relationship between immigration and public goods
spending. Bheim and Mayr (2005) use a model where natives derive less utility from
immigrants’ use of public goods. Their empirical work uses data from OECD countries and
find heterogeneous effects of high- vs low-skilled immigration. Specifically, while high-
skilled immigration has a positive effect on public spending, the presence of anti-social
effect means that low-skilled immigration has a negative effect on public spending.
In the United States, the education finance literature focuses primarily on the Mexican
immigrant population or the traditional immigrant settlement states. Coen-Pirani (2011)
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models education as a pure state public good and uses data from California to argue that
a 19% decrease in education spending can be attributed to immigration. However, he
does not account for the fact that in California a significant portion of spending is not
determined at the state level, and so education spending is not completely equalized across
the state. Furthermore, Mexican immigrants are a minority of all U.S. immigrants4, and so
a more complete analysis of the impact of immigration should also include the foreign-born
from countries other than Mexico.
Dottori et al. (2009) develop a theoretical model of how low-skilled immigration affects
public education spending. The mechanism studied in their paper is the erosion of the tax
base, coupled with an increased demand for private education and lower funding of public
education. Similarly to the Coen-Pirani model, education is considered a state public good
and local government responses are not considered in the authors’ analysis. Their paper
is solely theoretical and does not contain an empirical section. By bringing data from an
extended time period into my analysis, I am able to estimate a measure of the impact of
immigration.
Finally, the most closely related paper to my empirical work is that by Speciale (2012).
He analyzes the impact of immigration on the EU-15 countries using the distance from the
Balkan wars as an instrument and finds a small negative effect of immigration on public
education expenditures, an elasticity of -0.15. Similarly to Poterba and Ladd and Murray,
he also suggests that the channel driving this result is that ethnically diverse societies may
be valuing public goods lower than private goods. In contrast, my analysis is set in the
U.S. and takes advantage of the extensive data that has been collected on state districts
and demographics over a large time period, and my elasticity estimates fall within the
range of the elasticity estimates in these earlier papers.
1.2.2 State and local roles in K-12 public education finance
In this subsection, I describe how states and local districts make the decision on how
much public education funding to award to districts, and how that informs my theoretical
model.
Education funding is a shared responsibility between Federal, state, and local govern-
ments, but most of the burden lies with state and local governments. The state and local
government share is about 90% compared to the Federal government’s 10%, and this di-
vision has been stable over time, with a slight inclination toward more state spending.
4Mexican foreign-born people constitute about 28% of all foreign-born U.S. residents of 2014, and this
number has been decreasing over time. Source: Migration Policy Institute’s ACS/Census data tool accessed
at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/state-immigration-data-profiles.
5
Figure 1.3 shows the trend of education revenue by source.
The largest programs through which the Federal government funds education are No
Child Left Behind Title 1 Grants, which are directed toward school districts via funding
formulas based on student characteristics such as child poverty rates. The second largest
program are Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) Special Education Grants,
which are allocated to districts according to child statistics relating to disabilities. Never-
theless, education does not constitute a large fraction of the Federal government’s budget,
with only $55.9 billion going K-12 education in 2013, approximately 1.4% of the total
Federal budget that year. Furthermore, because most Federal education funding is tied to
these formulas under current law, there is less scope for the Federal government to respond
to immigration.
In contrast, K-12 education is the largest single element of state and local governments’
spending, about $620 billon in 2012-2013 (Figure 1), approximately 20% of their com-
bined total annual budget. There is a large variation both within- and across states of the
level of education spending (Figure 1.4, top panel). On one end of the distribution, Hawaii
funds 100% at the state level, since it has only one statewide school district and no local
districts. One the other hand, for most of the rest of the country, public education is a
shared expense between these two levels of government. The extent of a school district’s
authority to set budgets and raise revenue primarily depends on which education finance
system is used by the state where the school district is located. The decision on how to
spend the money earmarked for education, once it is collected, is also dependent on the
type of funding system in use. Figure 1.5 maps the states and the funding systems they
use as of 2007.
States allocate K-12 education funds to their constituent districts through funding for-
mulas, which are directly related to the school finance system. There are five primary cat-
egories of funding formulas currently in use, which may be used in combination by some
states. These categories, in order of popularity, are the foundation system, the flat grant,
local-effort equalization, equalization, and full state funding (Hightower et al. (2010)).5
The most common system of state funding, used by 38 states, is called the minimum
foundation program (MFP). States under MFP guarantee a minimum spending level per
student (also called foundation aid) and allow school districts to levy taxes to supplement
this amount if the guaranteed level is found insufficient. The responsibility of determining
the amount of foundation aid lies with state legislators and the state education agency,
5The analysis in this paper focuses on the experience of districts in states that use MFP. However, the
relationship between state contributions and local contributions depend highly on the properties of the state
finance system. As a result, the causal estimates presented in this paper may be different for states that do
not use MFP. This is explored further in Lucasan (2018).
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which may also include limits to how much additional millage (taxes) that the local school
board can levy.
Local education funding levels are set by school boards under the constraints specified
by state legislation. Because different states choose different tax rates and may have dif-
ferent rules for the extent to which the districts can top up the state contribution, there
is significant variation in the amount of public education revenues raised by local gov-
ernments both across and within states. Furthermore, even within the state constraints,
districts still have a lot of discretion on how much more additional taxes to raise for public
education and as a result, there is also significant variation in local education revenues
even within states (Figure 1.4, bottom panel).
The funding formula in use by each state can typically only be changed by a court case
challenging the constitutionality of the current funding formula, or through legislation,
both of which can be a difficult and drawn-out process.6 As a result, the funding system
used in a state is fairly consistent, and only in very few cases is it overturned more than
once each decade.7 Over time, the number of states using MFP has grown, and as a
result, U.S. K-12 education finance is increasingly a top-down funding system: first states
legislate the level of foundation aid, and second, the local government chooses a level of
local funding in response. This dynamic decision-making process between state and local
governments is the key characteristic in the model of education spending developed in this
paper.
1.3 Determining per-pupil revenues at state and local levels
In this section, I develop a model that describes how state and local governments mod-
ify their funding decisions in response to immigration. The basic set-up is based on the
model of Fernandez and Rogerson (2003), modified to account for immigration. The pri-
mary features of the model are twofold: first, state and local governments make decisions
sequentially, reflecting the top-down nature of funding decisions made in states using MFP.
Second, I account explicitly for immigrants having less political power than natives in mak-
ing the education funding decision at both levels of government.
The model assumes that the source of education revenues and the main avenue through
6Legislative changes in the funding system are more voluntary, in that the state decides whether to un-
dergo that change. Changes due to a court case are involuntary from the state’s perspective. In the empirical
work, as a robustness check I estimate all equations in a restricted sample only with states for which the last
state finance reform was due to a court case. The results do not change with the restricted sample.
7For a list of court cases that have overturned the prevailing school finance system, see Jackson et al.
(2015).
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which governments respond to immigration is a proportional income tax. The tax rate
decisions are made sequentially: first, states choose a state tax rate using the median voter
theorem to aggregate the constituent districts’ preferences, and once a statewide state tax
rate is determined, districts choose local tax rates to supplement the state tax.
Let ts and td be the state and local district income tax rates, respectively, and educa-
tion is funded through these taxes. While this is certainly a departure from the reality
of property taxes funding a significant proportion of education revenues, it is a common
assumption in the public goods literature. One can also think of these tax rates as taxes on
an aggregate of incomes and property values; that specification would also be consistent
with the model in this paper. The outcome variable corresponds to education revenues by
source of funding, which in this paper is the product of tax rates and income.
I assume that there is a continuum of agents of size 1 in each district, and that are two
types of agents in this economy, natives and immigrants. In order to simplify the analysis,
I characterize the districts according to the average income of the natives residing in the
district yi, and also by md, the fraction of the district population that is immigrant.
There are two goods in the economy, a consumption good c (private) and child ed-
ucation q (publically provided private good). I assume that education is funded by a
proportional tax on income, and all children attend local school districts. While there is a
significant amount of debate in the literature about how education spending is translated
to education quality, I abstract from this issue and suppose that q, the amount of child
education, depends only on the amount of spending per student.
In this model, because immigrants are assumed to not vote, the utility of the district
only depends on the utility of native residents, and so the private good consists of the
consumption of natives only. Thus, district utility is equivalent to average native utility in
the district. Later in this paper, I discuss extensions of this model where this assumption
is relaxed. Consider the following utility function for a district where the average native
income is yi, and has immigrant fraction md.
U = u(ci) + v(qi) (1.1)
In (1.1), u and v are increasing in c and q, respectively, and are concave. The constraints
are:
ci = (1− ts − td)yi
qi = tsy¯ + tdyd
Private consumption, ci = (1 − ts − td)yi, is whatever is left behind from income after
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paying taxes. Child education is the lone public good, and the total amount spent on
education is the sum of state and district tax revenues. The amount of educational funding
raised by the state that is allocated to any individual is tsy¯, where y¯ is the mean income in
the state. Similarly, tdyd is the amount of educational funding raised by the local district
that is allocated to any individual, where yd is the mean income in the district.
Both y¯ and yd include immigrant income because immigrants contribute fully to the tax
system and participate in public education. Mean district income can be expressed as
yd = (1−md)yi +mdym,
where yi, is mean native income, ym is immigrant mean income, and the fraction of im-
migrants in district d is md. Similarly, mean state income is just the weighted average of
native incomes and migrant incomes in the state.8
State legislators choose ts that applies to all districts in the state. A positive state tax
rate guarantees a minimum education spending level for these districts. The mechanism
that states use to determine ts is majority vote, which is characterized according to the
median voter theorem. That is, the state legislators look at the preferred tax rates of all
constituent districts and the median tax rate is chosen as the overall state tax rate. Because
the districts decide on a local tax rate given the state’s chosen a state tax rate, the districts
are able to incorporate the state’s choice in making a decision. To reflect the reality of how
education funding is determined in the foundation system, I model the tax rate decisions
as made at two stages: first, at the state level to determine the foundation tax rate, and
second, at the local level to determine the district tax rate.
The outcome of this model will be a single t∗s, and a value of t
∗
d for each constituent
district. I consider each of the two decision-making stages in turn.
1.3.1 Choosing the level of state education revenues
In this subsection, I describe the process through which a state tax rate is chosen in
states with a minimum foundation tax.
The state legislator solicits preferred state tax rates from school districts, and imple-
ments the median of these tax rates to be the state tax rate, in accordance with the mean
8Consider the following numerical example. Dexter School District, in southeast Michigan, has native
individuals with mean income $120 (yi), and immigrants with mean income $90 (ym). Suppose that 1/3
(md) of Dexter’s population is immigrant, and so overall district income is $100 (yd). If the current state tax
rate is 20% (ts) and the district tax rate is 15% (td), then Dexter’s schools’ budget will consist of $20 from
the state of Michigan and $15 from its own residents. Furthermore, average native individual has private
consumption is equal to $78, and the district’s utility is u(78) + v(35).
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voter theorem. Because the median voter’s choice of state tax rate prevails at the state
level, the median voter chooses state and local tax rates simultaneously. The median
voter’s objective function is
max
ts≥0,td≥0
u((1− ts − td)yi) + v(tsy¯ + tdyd)
The first-order conditions of this maximization are:
∂U
∂ts
= −yiu′ + y¯v′ ≤ 0 (1.2)
∂U
∂td
= −yiu′ + ydv′ ≤ 0 (1.3)
Only one of the FOCs can be satisfied at a time. Thus, unless the median district’s
income is the same as mean state income, its optimal choice will have at most one nonzero
t∗s and t
∗











In both equations, the expression on the left-hand side is the marginal rate of substi-
tution between private consumption and education, which is the same expression in both
of these equations. The expression on the right-hand side is the relative price of private
consumption and education. A utility-maximizing district chooses the funding source that
offers a lower relative price. This price is the tax price of education, and is defined to be
the additional taxes paid by the district in order to raise spending on education by $1.


















⇐⇒ y¯ < yd, and state funding is cheaper
when yd < y¯. By relying solely on the foundation grant, poorer districts’ education are
effectively subsidized by richer districts, and the chosen state tax redistributes from rich to
poor. On the other hand, rich districts would prefer no redistribution, as with positive tax
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rates they are subsidizing poorer districts with their taxes.
Formally, if t∗s > 0, then (1.2) implies that yiu
′ = y¯v′, and by (1.3),
−yiu′ + ydv′ ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ −y¯v′ + ydv′ ≤ 0
⇐⇒ yd ≤ y¯.
Similarly, t∗d > 0 ⇐⇒ y¯ ≤ yd. When the median district’s income is above the mean
state income, it prefers to finance education purely through district collections, but if the
median district’s income is below the mean state income, it prefers funding through state
collections.
To characterize the median district, observe that for every district that chooses a posi-
tive ts, the binding FOC is given by (1.2), and preferred tax rates satisfy
yiu
′((1− ts)yi) = y¯v′(tsy¯). (1.6)
Assuming that each of the districts places one vote for their preferred state tax rate, the
median voter theorem implies that the tax rate that is implemented is the tax rate preferred
by the median district. As the rich districts always choose ts = 0, the state tax rate will
be positive as long as the distribution of district incomes within the state is such that the
median income is below the mean income. Figure 1.6 shows the districts’ state tax choices,
and illustrates how the state tax is chosen from these options. The first panel shows how
preferred state tax rates change with district income, yd. All districts with yd > y¯ prefer
ts = 0, and all districts with yd < y¯ prefer ts > 0. Because I make no additional assumptions
regarding the utility functions or the distributions of incomes, preferred ts and yd have
covariance 0.
The second panel arranges the districts by preferred state tax rate, and indicates the
tax rate ultimately chosen at the state level. The median tax rate, t∗s, is positive when
the median of district incomes is lower than the mean of district incomes, and t∗s = 0
otherwise.
The effect of immigration on the state’s choice
Next, I consider what happens to districts’ preferred state tax rates and the prevailing
state tax rate in the presence of immigration.
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First, observe that the median voter’s preferred state tax rate is implicitly given by
ymedu






where ymed is the mean native income in the median district. This expression does not
depend on the level of immigration into the median district, and so the prevailing state tax
rate t∗s is unchanged by immigration into the median district.
Next, consider immigration into districts that are not the median voting district. As
long as immigrants have lower income than the district mean, poor districts remain poor
when immigration goes up. Poor districts’ choices of preferred state tax rates are do not
depend on immigration, so that the distribution of preferred tax rates is unchanged. This
implies that immigration into a poor district does not change the tax rate chosen at the
state level.
On the other hand, immigration into rich districts (those for whom yd > y¯) has differ-
ential effects on the district’s preferred tax rate depending on whether immigration causes
district income to fall below the threshold. Suppose that immigration is low enough so
that rich districts continue to be rich after increased immigration. In that case these dis-
tricts continue to prefer zero tax rates, and immigration into these districts does not affect
the distribution of preferred tax rates, and the implemented state tax rate is unchanged.
However, if a rich district (which by definition has yd > y¯) receives so much immigration
that its income falls below the mean state income, the districts’s preferred state tax rate
increases from ts = 0 to ts > 0. This change increases the chosen state tax rate if the
district’s new preferred tax rate is higher than the old state tax rate. For small changes
in immigration, however, the effect of immigration into districts that are not the median
district is zero.
Formally, the relationship between per-pupil state education revenues, t∗sy¯, and immi-




Similarly, the relationship between the change in per-pupil state education revenues and




A major assumption in this discussion is that all districts are considered equally by the
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state legislator without any consideration to district size – one district, one vote. This
means that if this assumption is relaxed to allow larger districts to have more votes, if
wealthier districts are larger, then the median preferred state tax rate will be lower than
that predicted by the model. This is because all the wealthy districts vote for no state tax
education funding, and so any estimate derived under the assumptions of this model will
be a lower bound on the true impact of immigration.
1.3.2 Choosing the level of district (local) education revenues
In this subsection, I move to characterizing the local tax rates chosen at the district
level, once a state tax rate has been selected.
Local districts choose local tax rates to maximize utility within the district. Consider
the case when the prevailing state tax rate is positive, which occurs when the median




u((1− t∗s − td)yi) + v(t∗sy¯ + tdyd) (1.10)
Districts are allowed to increase their education spending above the foundation grant
through additional taxes on district income, but are not allowed to go below the foundation
grant, so td cannot be negative. When districts opt not to top up the foundation grant, per-
pupil total education spending in the district is t∗sy¯ per student. Hence the positive state
tax rate guarantees a minimum education spending level for districts within the state.
The first-order condition is −yiu′((1−t∗s−td)yi)+ydv′(t∗sy¯+tdyd) ≤ 0. Some districts are
constrained by the state foundation grant to choose td = 0. These are districts that would
prefer less education, but are required by the state to provide at least t∗sy¯. The constrained
districts are those for which







On the other hand, some districts will opt to top up the foundation grant, by selecting
a positive t∗d. These districts face the following first-order condition:








The effect of immigration on the districts’ choice
Now I turn my attention to how the districts’ choice of local tax rates is affected by
changes in immigration.
In the first-order conditions (1.11) and (1.12) that determine optimal district tax rates,
immigration only appears in yd. Hence, the effect of immigration on a district’s choice of
tax rate can be characterized based only on how md impacts yd. When immigrants are
poorer than natives, more immigration results in a decrease of yd. If y′d is district income










That is, constrained districts, that choose td = 0, continue to be constrained when immi-
gration increases. All constrained districts choose td = 0, and so for these districts t∗d is
unaffected by an increase in immigration.
For districts that are unconstrained, I can apply the implicit function theorem on the
first-order condition. Hence, the effect of immigration on the district tax rate is
∂td
∂md





The sign of the relationship between the fraction of immigrants and district tax rates is the
same as the sign of (ym − yi)[v′ + tdydv′′] = (ym − yi)[v′(q) + qv′′(q)]. The expression v′(q) +
qv′′(q) is positive as long as the slopes of v’s indifference curves in (td, q) are increasing in
yd (I will refer to this property as ISI, for increasing slopes in income, henceforth). As a
proof, observe that the slope of v′s indifference curves are −yd
v′
. Taking the derivative of










Because v is increasing, when the slope is increasing in district income, it must be that
v′ + tdvdu′′ > 0.
Therefore the sign of
∂td
∂md
only depends on the sign of ym − yi. This implies that if im-
migrants are poorer than natives, then an influx of immigrants lowers the district’s optimal
td, and if immigrants are wealthier than natives, then immigration increases optimal td.9
9Consider the special case where the median district income in the state is higher than mean state income,
and the median district’s preferred t∗s is 0. This is a purely locally-financed education system, and total
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+ (ym − yi)td








Again, the term in the square brackets is positive if v satisfies ISI. This implies that
if, on average, immigrants earn less than natives in the district (ym − yi < 0), then more
immigration leads to both a lower td and also lower education spending at the district level.
On the other hand, if immigrants earn more than natives in the district (ym− yi > 0), then
more immigration leads to higher education spending.
Unlike the state case, the distribution of immigrants within the state matters in the
determination of t∗d. The response of local districts to immigration depends on how im-
migration affects overall district income. When immigrants are poorer than the district
residents, then immigration will decrease t∗d. Those districts that are already spending the
minimum amount on education are unable to decrease education spending further, so will
not change their fiscal behavior. On the other hand, when immigrants are wealthier than
the district residents, an influx of immigrants increases t∗d.









yi +md(ym − yi) . (1.16)
Hence when immigrants are relatively poor, or ym−yi < 0, increased immigration increases
education spending will only depend on local district tax rates. The district problem reduces to
max
td≥0
u((1− td)yi) + v(tdyd).
The first-order condition is−yiu′((1−td)yi)+ydv′(tdyd) ≤ 0. An optimal district tax rate exists for all districts














This is the same first-order condition as in the t∗s > 0 case. Therefore as long as v satisfies ISI, the same
model implications hold for t∗s = 0.
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the tax price of education at the district level, as the immigrants provide a smaller fraction
of tax revenues while consuming an equal amount of education. Similarly, when immi-
grants are relatively wealthy, more immigration decreases the tax price of education for
natives at the district level, as the new immigrants provide more taxes relative to increased
education costs. However, this mechanism works only at the district level.
1.3.3 Summary of model predictions
In the previous subsection, I developed a model of education finance that allows me to
make predictions on how immigration influences the amount of money raised to finance
public education.
The first implication of the model is that per-pupil state education revenues are inde-
pendent of immigration after controlling for average income within a state. This is because
for the median district, an additional dollar of education spending costs yi/y¯. As long as
native income in the median district is less than the state average income, the state tax
rate will be positive. Furthermore, immigration only affects the tax price of education for
the median district through its effect on state mean income. Hence, I have the following
empirical prediction: within a state, state education contributions allocated to a particular
district is independent of immigration into said district
The second implication of the model is that at the district level, per-pupil district rev-
enues are affected by immigration through the district mean tax rates. When deciding to
raise education revenues locally, an additional dollar of education spending costs yi/yd.
When immigrants are relatively poor, more immigration decreases yd relative to yi, and
the tax price of education spending is higher in those districts. This leads to less edu-
cation spending in districts with more immigration.For an illustrative example, consider
two districts where one has more immigrants than the other. Under the assumption that
immigrants are the same everywhere, in order for these districts to have the same average
income, it must be that district with the higher percentage of immigrants also has wealth-
ier natives.10 Then the tax price of education,yi/yd, is higher in the district with more
immigrants. If these districts get the same change in immigrant share, if the district with
wealthier natives will end up with lower district income, and the tax price of education will
10To see that this is true, note that since the average district incomes are the same,
yd = yd′ ⇐⇒ (1−md)yi +mdym = (1−md′)yi′ +md′ym
(1 +md′)(yi − yi′) = (md −md′)(yi − ym).
Because immigrants have on average lower incomes than natives, the term on the right-hand side has the
same sign as (md −md′). Therefore, when a district has more immigrants, md > md′ , then it must also have
higher native income, (yi > yi′) so that the two districts have the same average income.
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further increase. The model predicts that the district with wealthier natives will choose to
spend less on education in response to immigration.
Finally, in any school district, total education spending is t∗sy¯ + t
∗
dyd. The impact of
immigration on total tax revenues should broadly follow the direction of the impact on the
district tax rates, but should be smaller in percentage terms due to the district response
being diluted by the inaction of the state government.
A summary of model predictions is available in Table 1.1. In succeeding sections, I test
this set of predictions on U.S. data. I will first describe the data that I use and the empirical
equations, followed by an analysis of the main results.
1.4 Data
I test the implications of the model presented in the previous slide by applying it to
a unique panel dataset covering the period 1970-2007. The primary data sources are
the National Center for Education Statistics Local Education Agency Financial Surveys
(F-33) for school district spending data and tabulations from the decennial Censuses for
demographic data. For non-decennial years, I use the American Community Survey 2005-
2007 3-year estimates. The NCES data collects data from the population of school districts
only in years that end in 2 or 7. Hence the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 SD financial
data are from the surveys collected in 1972, 1982, 1992, and 2002 respectively. The 2007
financial data is from the 2007 wave of the NCES survey.
School district boundaries can change year to year, and in constructing a panel cover-
ing a long time period, it is very important to keep the school districts consistently defined
over time. In order to do so, I use the 1969-1970 Geographic Reference File to assign con-
temporary school districts to the county they would have belonged to in 1970, resulting
in a panel of observations at the county level. In cases where a school district belonged
to more than one county, I assign its data to the parent counties according to population
weight. For example, if the Ann Arbor school district had 80% of its population in Washt-
enaw county and 20% in Wayne county in 1970, then in subsequent years, I will always
assign Ann Arbor’s information to Washtenaw and Wayne counties in those proportions.
Constructing the panel at the county level has other advantages. First, counties are
consistently defined over a long period of time, certainly longer than school districts. Sec-
ond, school districts vary in the grades of schooling they offer, and some grade levels are
more expensive to offer than others. By aggregating up to the level of the county, these
concerns are minimized. This approach also ensures that the two-year gap between the
financial data collection and the decennial Census does not cause inconsistencies, since all
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the data is transformed into its equivalent 1970 county.
School districts can be broadly categorized as fiscally dependent or independent. De-
pendent school districts are those with no responsibility for fiscal decisions. Another gov-
ernment entity, often the local state, city, county, or municipal government, will approve
the budget and set appropriate tax rates to support these budgets in dependent school
districts. The vast majority of school districts, however, are fiscally independent, where
the local school boards have the authority to develop a district budget and set tax rates in
order to support their chosen budgets. The analysis is limited to independent school dis-
tricts, which are able to select their own budgets and set tax rates without going through
an external government entity.
In Hawaii, Maryland, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia, there are no inde-
pendent school districts. Hawaii and the District of Columbia both have just one school
district. Maryland and North Carolina both only have school districts that are run at the
county level. The remaining states generally have a combination of both dependent and
independent school districts.
My analysis also only includes states that use the minimum foundation system (as well
as states that use MFP in combination with another financial system), as the theoretical
model assumes a two-stage state and local decision that only occurs under MFP. While
increasing numbers of states use MFP, not all of them consistently use MFP throughout
the sample period. For some states, Supreme Court cases have reformed the existing state
finance system, and the primary state education finance system may change in between
time periods. I include a state x year observation in my sample as long as at the time the
financial data was collected, the state was under an MFP system. The data on court cases
is derived from Jackson, Johnson, and Persico [2014]. The full sample consists of 7,251
county-year observations between 1970 and 2007.
1.5 Empirical framework
In this section, I describe the equations I use to estimate the impact of immigration on
education spending, and analyze the findings at both state and local levels. The goal here
is to disentangle the separate responses of state and local governments to changing tax
prices induced by immigration. First, note that the model implications described in the
previous section are based on three parameters: the fraction of immigrant population, md;
average district income, yd; and, for the district-level analysis, prevailing state tax rates t∗s.
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The general form of the estimation equation is
lnYc,t = β0 + β1Immc,t + β2Incc,t +X
′
c,tδ + λstate + γt + c,t (1.17)
where the outcome variable, lnYc,t, is the logarithm of one of several fiscal per-student
variables in local county c. In the first set of results, lnYc,t is the log of current spend-
ing per student. This variable excludes not just capital outlays and current outlays but
also transfers to private schools and charter schools, and is most comparable to existing
analyses that only look at current spending. In the next set of results, lnYc,t is the log of
state education revenues per pupil and local education revenues per pupil. The primary
explanatory variable, Immc,t, is the proportion of foreign-born residents in local county
c at time t. I control for a set of various time-varying county characteristics, including a
proxy for education demand, the relative size of elderly and school-age populations, and
log median income within the county. I also include state- and time- fixed effects. I cluster
the standard errors at the county level.
Because the local county’s decision depends on the amount of state education contri-
butions, the estimation equation for local revenue estimation is
lnYc,t = β0 + β1Immc,t + β2Incc,t + β3StateRevc,t +X
′
c,tδ + λstate + γt + c,t (1.18)
where StateRevc,t is the amount of state contributions to public education in the county.
1.5.1 First-differenced estimates
Using changes in the fraction of foreign-born as an explanatory variable provides sev-
eral advantages over using levels of the fraction foreign-born. First, I am able to eliminate
bias due to time-invariant characteristics. Second, to the extent that immigration patterns
have changed over time, I am able to utilize increased variation in the immigrants’ location
decisions across time to estimate β1. In particular, consider that the state with the largest
increase in the share of population that is foreign-born is different in 1970 than it is in
2007.
I focus on long differences for two reasons: First, the one-year change in the fraction
of foreign-born population, my primary explanatory variable, is very small and exhibits
considerable noise. In addition, I am concerned about mean reversion in the fraction of
foreign-born population11. Looking at a longer difference allows a more accurate measure
11To think about mean reversion in the context of the foreign-born population, consider the following
example. Suppose that the number of immigrants entering Washtenaw county follows a fixed distribution.
In year t − 1, Washtenaw receives more immigrants than average. Since the distribution of immigrants is
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of the changes in foreign-born population. I perform my analysis using the decennial years
1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 200712.
I estimate the first-differenced equation version of (1.17),
∆ lnYc,t = β1∆Immc,t + β2∆Incc,t + ∆X
′
c,tδ + γt + εc,t (1.19)




When Yc,t is local revenues per pupil, the estimation equation is the first-differenced
version of (1.3),
∆ lnYc,t = β1∆Immc,t + β2∆Incc,t + β3∆StateRevc,t + ∆X
′
c,tδ + γt + εc,t (1.20)





A limitation of OLS or first-differences models when analyzing the impact of immigra-
tion on education spending is the possibility that the endogeneity of migrants’ location
decisions may lead to biased estimates. As suggested by Tiebout (1956), and several
subsequent papers (Goldstein and Pauly (1981), Rubinfield et al. (1987), among others),
families may sort into counties according to their preferred level of public good spending,
and this residential sorting would distort the causal effect of immigration of education rev-
enues. In particular, because public education benefits accrue primarily towards younger
households and households with children, counties that spend more on public education
may attract more immigrants. We might see that immigrants, who skew younger and may
have children that directly benefit from public education, select into areas with high edu-
cation spending. Alternatively, immigrants may prefer to move to areas with good labor
market conditions, or to areas that are more immigrant-friendly. The potential endogene-
ity of immigrant location decisions is corroborated by Figure 1.7, which shows that the
wealthiest counties have the fastest growing immigrant populations. To the extent that
wealth is a proxy for the good labor market conditions that attract immigration, one may
observe that counties with more immigration also spend more on education, but this could
constant, implies that in year t, Washtenaw is more likely to receive fewer immigrants compared to the
previous year. Mean reversion implies that ∆Immc,t = Immc,t − Immc,t−1 is lower, and leads to positive
bias in the β1 estimate.
12I use 2007 instead of 2010 to avoid confounding effects due to the Great Recession. As for the possibility
that the Great Recession may have impacted education finance prior to 2007, I present robustness checks of
all my estimates excluding 2007 from the analysis in a later section.
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just be the result of selection bias and not a truly causal effect.
An instrumental variable strategy is required to eliminate the bias caused by endo-
geneity and consistently estimate the effect of immigration of education spending. My
preferred instrument uses historical migration patterns to predict where new immigrants
choose to locate, similar to approaches taken in the immigration literature (Card (2001),
Wozniak and Murray (2012)). New immigrants tend to be concentrated geographically
and come to the same areas where earlier immigrants from the same source country have
chosen to reside (Bartel (1989)). That is, I employ an instrumental variable technique that
uses historical immigration settlement patterns to predict current migration patterns. This
instrument is particularly attractive because I avoid the possibility of endogenous sorting
among immigrants. It stands to reason that 1970 immigrant settlement patterns will not
affect contemporaneous choices of education spending outside of its impact on current











In (1.21), Ms,t is the number of people residing in state s whose reported year of entry
into the U.S. is between t − 1 and t. The variable Nc,1970 is the number of foreign-born
residents that live in county c in 1970, while Ns,1970 is the number of foreign-born residents
in the entire state s in 1970. Hence
Nc,1970
Ns,1970
is the fraction of all foreign-born in the state
that lived in the county. The variable Mˆc,t is an approximation of how many of the new
foreign-born that moved into the state moved into c.
Next, in (1.22), Tc,t−1 is the total number of residents of county c at time t− 1, so that
Nc,t−1
Tc,t−1




is an approximation of the fraction foreign-born in t. The instrument,
denoted IV, is an approximation of the change in the fraction of foreign-born population
between t− 1 and t.13
13Consider the following numerical example. In 1970, Washtenaw had 10 foreign-born residents, out of
the Michigan total of 100. Thus Nc,1970 = 10 and Ns,1970 = 100. If Michigan received 2000 new immi-
grants between 1990 and 2000, then the approximate number of new immigrants coming to Washtenaw is
(10/100)(2000) = 200. If in 1990 Washtenaw had 500 foreign-born residents and 1000 native-born residents,
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1.6 Results and Analysis
In this section, I present the result from the estimation framework described in the
previous section. I first analyze this data set graphically to observe if the patterns in levels
data are consistent with the model presented in the previous section. I then test whether
the instrumental variable I use is credible by checking that the identification assumptions
are satisfied. Then, I move on to formal analysis of the estimation findings.
1.6.1 Graphical analysis
I explore whether the predicted pattern between mean income and total spending is
apparent in the data even without controlling for any covariates. I categorize counties
into deciles according to their mean income. In Figure 1.8, I graph local, state, and total
education revenues against these deciles. What is apparent is that per-pupil state revenues
are decreasing income, and per-pupil local revenues are increasing with median income.
As local revenues increase more than the decrease in state revenues, overall education
revenue increases with income. The graph also shows that over the panel time period,
state contributions are higher than county contributions in relatively poorer counties, and
only for the top 2-3 deciles is the county contribution higher than state contributions.
Finally, I look at the relationship between state revenues and local revenues. Similarly
to the previous graph, I sort counties into deciles according to per-pupil state contributions
to education. I then graph how county revenues and total revenues14 evolve across these
deciles. Table 1.9 shows that as per-pupil state revenues increase, county contributions
fall before leveling off. This is consistent with the model prediction on county tax revenue:
the higher state taxes are, the more counties are constrained to choosing not to top up the
foundation grant. Hence, for high state contributions the county contributions level off
and become flat. Furthermore, at low levels of state contributions, average local revenues
are higher because fewer counties are constrained. Finally, total spending is U-shaped
relative to state revenues, so that the counties that receive the lowest and highest amounts
of state aid have relatively high total education revenues per pupil.












14Total revenues is the sum of Federal, state, and local education revenues per pupil.
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1.6.2 Testing the credibility of the instrumental variable approach
The identification strategy requires two assumptions: that the instrument is correlated
with actual changes in the fraction of foreign-born population, and that it is uncorrelated
with the other factors that affect per-pupil state and local education revenues.
I provide evidence for these assumptions. Table 1.4 contains an estimate of the first-
stage relationship between the instrument and the change in fraction of foreign-born pop-
ulation in each state for the baseline specification for estimating state revenues. It also
contains the first-stage estimate where ∆StateRevc,t is added as a regressor, which is the
specification used to estimate the local revenue equation. The F-statistics in both spec-
ifications are similar, 25.96 and 25.81 respectively15. This indicates a strong first-stage
relationship and is evidence that the first assumption is satisfied.
Next, I investigate support for the exogeneity assumption required for IV estimation.
Table 1.5 has estimates of the relationship between the pre-existing trend in per-pupil
state and local revenues from 1965 -197016 and the instrument. If the instrument is able
to predict the pre-existing trend, then the instrument is very likely to fail the exogene-
ity assumption. I find that the coefficient estimate of this relationship is not statistically
significant. To address concerns about the extent to which this finding may be due to
confounding effects of traditional immigrant settlement states, I rerun these regressions
while excluding Texas and California. I find that excluding Texas and California reduces
the coefficient estimate of the effect of immigration on this pre-existing trend. However, I
find no significant impact. Thus, these tests indicate that the instrument is not driven by
these immigrant states.
1.6.3 Estimation results
I now turn to analysis of the estimation results. The OLS levels estimates do not follow
the same pattern described in the model. Instead, it shows that state education revenues
are lower and local education revenues are higher in counties that experience the most
immigration (Tables 1.2 and 1.3, respectively). However, in Figures 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12,
I construct scatterplots of state-level changes in immigration over the time period 1970-
2000 and the corresponding change in per-pupil fiscal variables. Figure 1.10 shows the
correlation between the change in the fraction of foreign-born population and the change
in per-pupil current spending between 1970 to 2007. I construct state-level observations
15The similarity of these F-statistics is as expected. The only difference in these first-stage regressions is
the addition of a single covariate, ∆StateRevc,t.
16Due to the timing of the Local Finance Surveys, this variable is actually the change in per-pupil revenues
between the 1967 and 1972 waves of the survey.
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by taking the mean of these variables across all counties in each state, weighted by the
county population in 2007. I then draw a scatterplot of these variables. I observe that
states that have higher increases in the fraction of foreign-born population have lower
increases in per-pupil current spending. Figure 1.11 is similar to Figure 1.10, but with
shorter 10-year differences, to illustrate that this negative relationship is also visible with
shorter time horizons. Figure 1.11 contains the corresponding scatterplots for the changes
between the following years: 2000-2007 (Panel a.), 1990-2000 (Panel b.), 1980-1990
(Panel c.), and 1970-1980 (Panel d.). I observe that the negative correlation observed
with current spending between 1970-2007 is also apparent when looking at these shorter
ten-year differences. These general trends mirror the predictions of the model presented
in the previous section. Figure 1.12 shows the correlation between changes in the frac-
tion of foreign-born population and per-pupil state revenue (Panel a.) and per-pupil local
(county) revenue (Panel b.). The same pattern is evident: States with higher increases
in the fraction of foreign-born population have lower increases in both per-pupil state
revenues and per-pupil local revenues.
These estimates and scatterplots suggest that per-pupil current spending and per-pupil
local revenues rose less in states that saw the largest growth in the fraction of immigrants.
This also suggests that the correct estimation strategy should focus on changes, not levels.
In other words, running first-differenced regressions will give a more accurate estimate of
how education responds to immigration.
Tables 1.6 and 1.7 present the first-difference OLS and 2SLS estimates of the effect
of a rising fraction of foreign-born population on state-sourced and locally-sourced K-12
education revenues. The first coefficient estimate presented corresponds to β1, the coeffi-
cient on the primary explanatory variable, which is the change in the fraction-foreign born
residing in the county. The second coefficient estimate presented, β2, is the coefficient
on changes in median family income. Standard errors, which are presented below the
coefficient estimates in parentheses, are clustered at the county level.
The first four columns of Table 1.6 present the first-differenced OLS results for the state
revenue equation. I find that per-pupil state education revenues are negatively associated
with education spending. Furthermore, accounting for county-level controls on the age
distribution and demand for education does not eliminate this association. However, the
magnitude of the estimate decreases as I add more regressors, which indicates a potential
relationship between the change in fraction-foreign born and county characteristics.
The remaining columns of Table 1.6 contain the instrumental variable results. The
IV estimates are not significant, which are in line with the model predictions presented
earlier. In column (6), I control for the change in the fraction of college-educated residents,
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which is a proxy for the county’s preference for education. Adding this regressor decreases
the magnitude of the IV estimate, but the estimate on fraction college-educated is not
statistically significant. In column (6), I add controls for the age distribution of residents in
the county. The coefficient on the fraction of population that is under age 18 is significant
and negative, but this is likely due to the high correlation between this variable and the
number of students enrolled in the county, and is just a mechanical relationship. The
coefficient for the fraction of population that is above age 65 is negative, consistent with
the elderly voting in their own self-interest (Ladd and Murray (2001)), but the estimate is
not statistically significant.
The coefficient for median income is negative and statistically significant for the first
three IV specifications (Columns (5), (6), and (7)), which is consistent with the predictions
of the model. However, controlling for the poverty rate (Column (8)) causes the coeffi-
cient on median income to become insignificant. This indicates that counties with more
poverty receive higher state contributions to education. This indicates that poverty rates
and median income perform similar roles for determining state contributions to education
within a county.
Although they are insignificant, the IV estimates for the effect of a change in the fraction
foreign-born population are more negative compared to the equivalent OLS estimates. This
is as predicted – the OLS estimates do not account for the fact that immigrants may sort
into counties according to factors like labor market conditions that also impact the level
of state education revenues received by the county. To the extent that these labor market
conditions are also favorable for state education contributions, I would expect that the OLS
estimates are going to be more positive compared to the IV estimates for the state revenue
estimation.
Table 1.7 presents the first-differenced OLS and IV results for the per-pupil local ed-
ucation revenues estimation. In contrast to the state-level estimates, all reported county
characteristics are estimated to be statistically significant. As median voter politics implies
that local county characteristics are less important for determining state contributions to
education than for county contributions, this result is as expected.
The OLS results show a negative and significant relationship between the fraction
foreign-born variable and local revenues. Similar to the state case, this is consistent with
the observation that immigrants move to the wealthiest counties, to the extent that wealth
is correlated with good labor market conditions or higher property values that on their
own would raise local tax revenues. The endogeneity of the fraction foreign-born variable
indicates that the OLS estimates will bias the results of a regression as a measure, and
underestimate the negative causal impact of immigration on education revenues.
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The IV estimates for the causal impact of the change in the fraction foreign-born on
local education revenues are negative and statistically significant. I find that a 1% increase
in the fraction foreign-born residing in a county causes a decrease in local education rev-
enues raised by the county by 7.4%. This corresponds to a decrease of approximately $319
per pupil when evaluated at the 2007 average county revenue level. This is also equivalent
to an elasticity of -0.43 when evaluated at the 2007 mean fraction foreign-born.
The coefficients on the other covariates are also mostly significant, and the signs of
which are consistent with the predictions of the model. Across all specifications, higher
state contributions to education are associated with lower local contributions. In my pre-
ferred specification, the estimated elasticity is -.16, which implies that a 10% increase in
per-pupil state contributions to education is associated with a 1.6% decline in per-pupil
local education effort. Hence state contributions crowd out local funding for education.
Higher median district incomes are also positive and statistically significant. Adding a
proxy for the county’s preference for education (Column (6)) increases the magnitude of
coefficient on the fraction foreign-born population, but this effect disappears after addi-
tional covariates are added. The coefficients on fraction foreign-born, state contributions,
and county mean income are also stable after controlling for the age distribution (Column
(7)) and the county poverty rate (Column (8)).
Finally, I perform the estimation again while excluding the 2007 observations from
analysis. This is in order to avoid confounding effects induced by the Great Recession
that may have started earlier than 2007. Table 1.8 reports the coefficient estimates for
the state-level regression. Compared to the estimates from the full sample (Table 1.6),
the magnitudes are slightly lower, but are still insignificant. Table 1.9 reports estimates
for local-level regressions. Compared to the estimates from the full sample (Table 1.7),
these estimates are larger in magnitude but have the same sign. These estimates from the
restricted samples are consistent with the model implications.
1.7 Conclusion
Although there is a broad literature documenting a negative association between im-
migration and public education spending, much of the focus has been on identifying social
mechanisms through which this impact propagates. In this paper, I revisit the causal ef-
fect of immigration on education finance by focusing on the fiscal impact of immigration.
I develop a model that considers the separate responses of state and local governments
to immigration, observing that traditional analyses of education finance that use current
education spending as the fiscal variable of interest do not tell a complete story about the
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impact of immigration. My analysis of state and local government responses shows that
there is no evidence that state governments respond to immigration, but that local gov-
ernments respond significantly, decreasing education spending by 7.4% when immigration
increases by 1 percentage point, about $319 when evaluated at the 2007 average county
revenue level. This effect corresponds to an elasticity of -0.43.
This paper finds that the resistance to inflows of low-income immigrants evidenced by
decreasing public education revenues in locales with high immigration can be rationalized
by the fact that education is now more expensive. In particular, it provides a political econ-
omy justification for why the U.S. voter may appear xenophobic, and a closer examination
in the context of public education provision reveals that the purely monetary aspect of the
cost of immigration explains this phenomenon. Furthermore, if the negative effect on edu-
cation revenues by immigration is not ideal, then this paper motivates a potential solution:
since state revenues do not respond to immigration, placing more of the responsibility of
education funding to the state would reduce expenditure differentials within states.
An open avenue for future research is to further explore extensions of this model, par-
ticularly in two dimensions. First, the native-born can respond to in influx of immigrants
by sending their children to private school. Private schooling17 is a private good that sub-
stitutes for the public good, so I would expect to see a larger increase in the tax price of
education in response to immigration as native families opt to exit the public education sys-
tem. Second, additional research is needed to study how the education funding decisions
change as immigrants naturalize and become natives themselves. Immigrants naturaliz-
ing would affect native income as the composition of natives changes, and I would expect
that the effect of immigration on education funding weakens as immigrants and natives
become more similar in income.




Figure 1.1: Growth of the U.S. foreign-born population
This figure shows the growth of the United States foreign-born population every decade
from 1970 to 2015. The number of foreign-born residents has been increasing over the
past five decades. As the immigrant population grows in numbers and as a share of
population, it is increasingly important to analyze their fiscal impact on the communities
they move to.
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Figure 1.2: Mean household income over time, by nativity of the head of household
This figure illustrates one of the major differences between foreign-born and native
households. Households with heads that are foreign-born have lower median incomes
than households with heads that are US-born. This relationship persists from 1970 to
present.
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Figure 1.3: Share of K-12 education revenue by source
Historically, most of the responsibility to fund K-12 education lies with state and local
districts. Approximately 45% of total K-12 education funding is raised by state
governments, and a roughly equal amount is from local governments, while about 9%
comes from the Federal government. These shares have remained fairly constant over
time, outside of an increase in Federal funds beginning in the Great Recession.
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Figure 1.4: Variation in total education spending
There is a large variation in within-state per-pupil total spending (top panel). However,
there is just as much variation in per-pupil within-state local district education revenues.
Analyses that only look at total spending ignore the nuances that can be studied with a
model that looks at the components of total spending.
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Figure 1.5: State education funding systems, 2007
This shows the properties of education funding systems used by states as of FY 2007,
using survey data and the categorization of Verstegen (2011). The vast majority of states
(45) use a state foundation system of some form. The model described in this paper is
based on a state foundation system.
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Figure 1.6: Preferred state tax rates
The left panel illustrates the relationship between district income, yd, and districts’
preferred state tax rates. Rich district (those for which y¯ < yd) prefer purely local
funding, where ts = 0. Poor districts prefer ts > 0. As long as the mass of rich districts is
less than 0.5 (or, mean state income is higher than the median), the tax rate chosen by
state legislators, t∗s, is positive, and the state will provide a positive amount of education
revenues
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Figure 1.7: The relationship between wealth and immigration
Wealthier districts, particularly the top quintile, attract more immigrants. To the extent
that wealth is correlated to more favorable labor market conditions or other variables that
affect both education revenues and immigration, OLS estimates may be biased. An
instrument is necessary to capture the unbiased causal effect of immigration and
education finance.
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Figure 1.8: Education revenue by source and income, 1970-2007
(a) 2007 (b) 2000
(c) 1990 (d) 1980
(e) 1970
The relationship between education revenue by source and county-level income deciles.
Total education contributions and state contributions are weakly increasing in income,
while state contributions are weakly decreasing in income for all years in the sample.
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Figure 1.9: Education revenue by source and state contributions, 1970-2007
(a) 2007 (b) 2000
(c) 1990 (d) 1980
(e) 1970
The relationship between total education revenue, from local sources and state education
revenue deciles. Total education contributions are first decreasing and then increasing as
state contributions increase. Local education revenues are high for low levels of state
contribution, and fall rapidly. At higher levels of state contributions, local education
revenues are flat. This general pattern holds for all years in the sample.
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Figure 1.10: Immigration and education spending, 1970-2007
Correlation = -0.3274. There is a clear negative relationship between the change in the
fraction foreign-born between 1970 and 2007 and the corresponding change in total
current spending.
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Figure 1.11: Immigration and education spending, shorter time periods
(a) Changes 2000-2007 (b) Changes 1990-2000
(c) Changes 1980-1990 (d) Changes 1970-1980
States with higher increases in the fraction of foreign-born population also have lower
increases in per-pupil current spending. The negative relationship between the change in
the fraction foreign-born and the corresponding change in total spending is evident even
with shorter differences.
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Figure 1.12: Immigration and state and local revenue
(a) ρ = −0.2312. Change in per-pupil state revenue, 1970-2007
(b) ρ = −0.1211. Change in per-pupil local revenues, 1970-2007
Trends in the change in the fraction foreign-born and changes in education revenue by
source. The negative correlation between state and local education revenues is visible
even in long differences.
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1.9 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary of model predictions
Variable State revenue Local revenue
Fraction foreign-born, ∆Immd,t 0 Negative
(β1)
Median income, ∆Incd,t Negative Positive
(β2)
State contributions, ∆StateRev - Negative (low state funds)
(β3) 0 (high state funds)
This table summarizes the predictions of the model on the signs of the coefficients of
different variables in (1.19) and (1.20).
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Table 1.2: State revenue level regressions using OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(State revenue) log(State revenue) log(State revenue) log(State revenue)
Fraction foreign-born -1.044∗∗∗ -0.927∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗∗ -0.978∗∗∗
(0.188) (0.195) (0.193) (0.191)
Median income -0.373∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ -0.319∗∗∗ -0.0820
(0.0266) (0.0330) (0.0337) (0.0620)
Fraction college -0.393∗∗∗ -0.430∗∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.111) (0.124)
Fraction under age 18 -0.404∗ -0.721∗∗∗
(0.175) (0.184)




Observations 7268 7268 7268 7268
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The unit of analysis is the county. The dependent variable is the logarithm of state contributions to public education
allocated to the county, deflated by the National Income and Products Accounts deflator for government purchases of goods
and services. All variables are first-differenced. The specifications include year- and state-fixed effects, and the standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.3: Local revenue level regressions using OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Local revenue) log(Local revenue) log(Local revenue) log(Local revenue)
Fraction foreign-born 0.219 0.0871 0.401∗ 0.423∗
(0.183) (0.186) (0.183) (0.183)
State contributions -0.287∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗ -0.291∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0174)
Median income 0.757∗∗∗ 0.680∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗ 0.660∗∗∗
(0.0306) (0.0366) (0.0373) (0.0612)
Fraction college 0.457∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗ 0.411∗∗
(0.122) (0.122) (0.130)
Fraction under age 18 -1.449∗∗∗ -1.369∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.210)




Observations 7268 7268 7268 7268
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The unit of analysis is the county. The dependent variable is the logarithm of local contributions to public education raised
by the county, deflated by the National Income and Products Accounts deflator for government purchases of goods and
services. All variables are first-differenced. The specifications include year- and state-fixed effects, and the standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.4: IV credibility estimates
First-stage regression
Endogenous variable: % Foreign-born
Basic specification Includes ∆StateRev as regressor
IV 0.1786*** 0.1783***
F-stat = 25.96 F-stat = 25.81
The table below contains the first-stage regressions of the instrument described in
subsection 1.5.2. The first column is the first-stage using the largest set of county-level
covariates. The second column includes the change in state contributions to education
funding in the county as a regressor.
Table 1.5: IV falsification tests, 1965-1970
State revenues Local revenues
IV -1.65 -1.36 -2.90 -2.12
(2.65) (3.04) (3.37) (4.21)
Excludes CA, TX X X
This table tests the exogeneity assumption for the validity of the IV estimation. I test
whether the instrument is related the pre-existing trend in changes in state education
revenue and local education revenue allocated to the district. To assuage concerns about
whether the traditional immigrant states are driving this relationship, I test this
relationship for states excluding CA and TX.
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Table 1.6: Estimates of effects on per-pupil state revenue, 1970-2007
OLS estimates IV estimates
log(State revenue) log(State revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction foreign-born -0.591∗ -0.548∗ -0.351 -0.421 -2.807 -2.738 -2.279 -2.094
(0.256) (0.261) (0.263) (0.266) (1.516) (1.590) (1.572) (1.528)
Median income -0.114∗ -0.103∗ -0.103∗ -0.0192 -0.126∗∗ -0.121∗ -0.119∗ -0.0185
(0.0480) (0.0484) (0.0478) (0.0523) (0.0489) (0.0507) (0.0502) (0.0520)
Fraction college -0.280 -0.256 -0.356 -0.117 -0.116 -0.253
(0.200) (0.201) (0.209) (0.243) (0.240) (0.238)
Fraction under age 18 -1.319∗∗∗ -1.339∗∗∗ -1.166∗∗∗ -1.210∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.217) (0.242) (0.238)
Fraction above age 65 -0.209 -0.188 -0.181 -0.160
(0.203) (0.203) (0.204) (0.205)
Poverty rate 0.354∗ 0.414∗∗
(0.139) (0.147)
Constant 0.478∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ 0.415∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.110∗∗ -0.224∗ -0.236∗
(0.0115) (0.0126) (0.0168) (0.0191) (0.0419) (0.0413) (0.0953) (0.0948)
Observations 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The unit of analysis is the county. The dependent variable is the logarithm of state contributions to public education
allocated to the county, deflated by the National Income and Products Accounts deflator for government purchases of goods
and services. All variables are first-differenced. The specifications include year- and state-fixed effects, and the standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.7: Estimates of effects on per-pupil local revenue, 1970-2007
OLS estimates IV estimates
log(Local revenue) log(Local revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction foreign-born -0.957∗∗∗ -1.138∗∗∗ -0.895∗∗∗ -0.898∗∗∗ -7.246∗∗∗ -8.253∗∗∗ -7.504∗∗ -7.392∗∗
(0.219) (0.224) (0.231) (0.234) (2.188) (2.388) (2.340) (2.279)
State contributions -0.151∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.162∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0177) (0.0176) (0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0175) (0.0175)
Median income 0.410∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗
(0.0489) (0.0511) (0.0511) (0.0589) (0.0516) (0.0568) (0.0565) (0.0594)
Fraction college 1.167∗∗∗ 1.186∗∗∗ 1.181∗∗∗ 1.697∗∗∗ 1.664∗∗∗ 1.580∗∗∗
(0.200) (0.201) (0.206) (0.294) (0.287) (0.272)
Fraction under age 18 -1.778∗∗∗ -1.779∗∗∗ -1.260∗∗∗ -1.288∗∗∗
(0.224) (0.224) (0.285) (0.279)
Fraction above age 65 -0.741∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -0.647∗∗ -0.635∗∗
(0.191) (0.191) (0.202) (0.203)
Poverty rate 0.0165 0.254
(0.138) (0.164)
Constant 0.345∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.0701∗ 0.0380 -0.381∗∗∗ -0.388∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0222) (0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0343) (0.0349) (0.102) (0.0999)
Observations 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251 7251
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The unit of analysis is the county. The dependent variable is the logarithm of local contributions to public education raised
by the county, deflated by the National Income and Products Accounts deflator for government purchases of goods and
services. All variables are first-differenced. The specifications include year- and state-fixed effects, and the standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.8: Robustness to excluding 2007: estimates of effects on per-pupil state revenue, 1970-2000
OLS estimates IV estimates
log(State revenue) log(State revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction foreign-born -0.634∗ -0.586∗ -0.301 -0.374 -3.050 -2.965 -2.736 -2.520
(0.289) (0.295) (0.296) (0.300) (1.674) (1.735) (1.659) (1.604)
Median income -0.127∗ -0.115∗ -0.107∗ -0.0210 -0.137∗∗ -0.130∗ -0.127∗ -0.0209
(0.0505) (0.0508) (0.0502) (0.0556) (0.0510) (0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0553)
Fraction college -0.331 -0.301 -0.411 -0.166 -0.148 -0.301
(0.224) (0.224) (0.235) (0.265) (0.256) (0.256)
Fraction under age 18 -1.951∗∗∗ -1.962∗∗∗ -1.769∗∗∗ -1.804∗∗∗
(0.290) (0.289) (0.303) (0.299)
Fraction above age 65 -0.00437 0.0512 -0.179 -0.0901
(0.337) (0.339) (0.349) (0.348)
Poverty rate 0.357∗ 0.433∗∗
(0.149) (0.157)
Constant 0.460∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.426∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗ 0.396∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0208) (0.0234) (0.0446) (0.0442) (0.0432) (0.0431)
Observations 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The unit of analysis is the county. The dependent variable is the logarithm of state contributions to public education
allocated to the county, deflated by the National Income and Products Accounts deflator for government purchases of goods
and services. All variables are first-differenced. The specifications include year- and state-fixed effects, and the standard
errors are clustered at the county level.
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Table 1.9: Robustness to excluding 2007: estimates of effects on per-pupil local revenue, 1970-2000
OLS estimates IV estimates
log(Local revenue) log(Local revenue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Fraction foreign-born -1.015∗∗∗ -1.201∗∗∗ -0.888∗∗∗ -0.903∗∗∗ -6.255∗∗ -7.131∗∗ -6.542∗∗ -6.412∗∗
(0.246) (0.250) (0.264) (0.267) (2.149) (2.307) (2.135) (2.074)
State contributions -0.160∗∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.172∗∗∗ -0.166∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗ -0.175∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0181) (0.0182)
Median income 0.382∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.360∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.0517) (0.0539) (0.0546) (0.0637) (0.0534) (0.0576) (0.0588) (0.0638)
Fraction college 1.298∗∗∗ 1.312∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗ 1.707∗∗∗ 1.666∗∗∗ 1.572∗∗∗
(0.221) (0.222) (0.229) (0.298) (0.283) (0.274)
Fraction under age 18 -2.452∗∗∗ -2.455∗∗∗ -2.035∗∗∗ -2.059∗∗∗
(0.308) (0.308) (0.342) (0.339)
Fraction above age 65 -0.348 -0.337 -0.754∗ -0.699∗
(0.325) (0.324) (0.355) (0.348)
Poverty rate 0.0729 0.267
(0.148) (0.165)
Constant 0.378∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.126∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0248) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0388) (0.0396) (0.0415) (0.0410)
Observations 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203 6203
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
The unit of analysis is the county. The dependent variable is the logarithm of local contributions to public education raised
by the county, deflated by the National Income and Products Accounts deflator for government purchases of goods and
services. All variables are first-differenced. The specifications include year- and state-fixed effects, and the standard errors
are clustered at the county level.
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CHAPTER II
The Impact of the Great Recession on K-12 Public
Education Finance
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I analyze the impact of increased Federal education contributions on
state and district education revenues. I use increases in Federal education grants induced
by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“Recovery Act”, “ARRA”) to identify this
impact by exploiting the formulaic nature of Federal grant allocations that affected school
districts differentially. This approach also allows me to decompose the impact based on
whether the increased grants were channeled through existing Federal grant programs or
new, temporary grant programs.
The Great Recession was the worst economic downturn in the United States since the
1930s. At its height, the US government introduced anti-recession measures with the
Recovery Act in 2009. The Recovery Act resulted in increased Federal spending intended
to offset slowdowns in spending by other economic sectors.
K-12 public education was one of the areas that received significant additional funding,
and as a result, the Federal government took on a larger fraction of district education bud-
gets. Figure 2.1 shows how the composition of K-12 education revenue changed around
the implementation of the Recovery Act, indicated by the vertical red line. The Federal
share of education revenues increased from 8% in 2008 to a peak of 12% in 2010.
The same pattern is even starker in dollar terms. Figure 2.2 illustrates the average
amount of per-pupil Federal, state and local contributions to education for 2005-2013.
The average amount received by school districts from the Federal government increased
from about $850 in 2008 to $1300 in 2009, an increase of approximately 50%, before
decreasing to its pre-recession level. In contrast, state contributions declined sharply after
2009, and stayed low thereafter. Local education contributions did not experience a similar
trend break around the recession.
48
My research question relates to the “flypaper effect” of education grants. Theoreti-
cally, government funds are fungible, so the source of funds should not affect how and
where these funds are spent. In practice, however, increased intergovernmental grants
raise spending by more than the theoretical prediction.1 As a result, intergovernmental
grants intended for specific purposes do not only crowd out other funds, but also affect the
distribution of spending.
Hines and Thaler (1995) survey the flypaper effect literature. Empirical estimates in
a large variety of contexts are mixed; an additional dollar of grants is found to increase
spending by local agencies by $0.25 to $1. Various papers have studied the flypaper effect
of education grants in the context of education spending. Fisher and Papke (2000) survey
some of this literature. Many of the papers that analyze expansions of Federal grants focus
on Title 1, a large Federal grants program designed to support poor students’ educational
services and achievement. Nevertheless, even in this more specific context, estimates of
the impact of increases in Federal spending are mixed. Feldstein (1978) estimates that a
dollar of additional Title 1 grants results in an increase of $0.72 in total spending. Gordon
(2004) used changes in per-pupil grant allocations caused by updates in Census-derived
measurements to identify the effect of Title 1 on state and education revenues. She finds
that state and local revenue efforts are unaffected by Title 1 changes in the short term,
so that spending increases dollar to dollar. However, the effect is temporary, as local
governments crowd out Title 1 grants within 3 years. Cascio et al. (2013) analyzed the
effects of the introduction of Title 1 of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act
on education spending in the South. They find that on average, an additional dollar of
Title 1 funds increased local spending by only $0.50.
This paper builds on the existing literature relating to education finance in general,
and makes two key contributions. First, I evaluate the effect of a large expansion of Fed-
eral funding on state and local education spending in the broader context of the Great
Recession. Other papers that have examined the impact of the Great Recession on ed-
ucation have focused on the specific experience of schools in New York and New Jersey
(Chakrabarti et al. (2013), Chakrabarti and Setren (2015), Bhalla et al. (2017)).
Second, I consider both permanent programs (that is, expansions of Federal grant pro-
grams that already existed prior to the recession) and temporary Federal grant programs
(one-time cash infusions) and study how fiscal responses to each type of grant differ. Ear-
lier literature in public education finance has focused solely on permanent expansions like
the introduction of key Federal grant programs or changes in the underlying district char-
acteristics that drive the formulas used to allocate these grants. Permanent expansions are
1The money “sticks where it hits,” hence the term “flypaper effect.”
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likely to have different effects compared to the short-term expansions, so it is important to
differentiate between them when analyzing expansions of Federal grant programs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the institutional
background of US education finance and the Recovery Act. Section 2.3 describes the data
used in this analysis. In Section 2.4, I describe the estimation strategy and the underly-
ing identification assumptions. In Section 2.5, I describe my results. Finally, Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Institutional background
This section consists of two parts. In the first, I describe the roles of different govern-
ment entities over K-12 education funding. In the second, I describe the Recovery Act, the
context in which it was introduced, and its implications for education finance.
2.2.1 K-12 education finance at the Federal level
Historically, the Federal government has not had a large role in funding K-12 education,
and most of the funds for education in the US is primarily sourced at the state and local
level. Federal sources account for about 8% of total spending. Figure 2.1 shows the
evolution of Federal, state, and local contributions over time. Although the shares have
remained fairly constant during the time period of interest, it is clear that around the same
time as the Great Recession, these shares shifted notably.
Federal funding is driven by two large programs: Title 1 and IDEA Special Education
grants. The remainder of all Federal grants, about 1/3 of the total, is made up of smaller
programs including ESL programs and competitive teacher incentive grants.
Title 1 grants were legislated with the passing of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act (ESEA), as part of President Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty” in 1965. ESEA
is the most extensive legislation regarding Federal funding for education, and Title 1 con-
tinues to be the largest federal program for K-12 education. The Title 1 grant program is
targeted toward low-income students, and funds are distributed according to school dis-
tricts’ poverty, enrollment, and the average per-pupil expenditures in the state. Specifically,
Title 1 funds are allocated by formula based on relative population aged 5-24, and relative
total population.2 Because Title 1 grants are tied to child poverty rates, states and districts
that have higher poverty rates tend to receive larger grants. The vast majority of school
2Title 1 consists for four separate grant programs. More details about how Ti-
tle 1 funds are allocated can be found in the Department of Education website,
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html
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districts (84.8% in my final sample, described in the next section) received some Federal
Title 1 grants in 2007.
IDEA Special Education grants are so named because they were created with the pass-
ing of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”) in 1990. These grants
are funds targeted towards students with disabilities. These grants are provided to the
states, which must then decide to allocate these funds to their constituent school districts.
While formulas used to allocate funds vary across states, generally funding goes to school
districts with larger shares of students with disabilities (Cullen (2003)). Similar to Title 1
grants, most school districts (68% in my sample) received some Special Education funds
in 2007.
2.2.2 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
President Barack Obama signed the ARRA into law in February 2009, which was a
policy response and a key element of the government’s effort against the recession that
began in late 2007 and accelerated during 2008. The Recovery Act provided $840 billion
in new spending, about $98 billion of which was designated for education. The stated
purpose of these funds was to stabilize state and local government budgets, by increasing
government spending to make up for contractions elsewhere.
The Department of Education determined allocations at the state level, and stimulus
funds were released to states beginning in April 2009. State governments had discre-
tion over when the funds were released to local school districts, but were allowed until
September 2011 to do so for all three programs.
The majority of ARRA education funds, about 80%, was spent on K-12 education. First,
Recovery Act funds were used to bolster the two major Federal education grant programs:
$13 billion was distributed through the Title 1 program, and $12.2 billion through IDEA
Special Ed grants. Second, the Federal government created a new, one-time appropria-
tion of $53.6 billion, called the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (“SFSF”). A smaller frac-
tion of ARRA education funds, $17.1 billion, went to Pell grants, which are for higher
(post-secondary) education. The remainder, about $2.3 billion, was earmarked for tech-
nology improvements and teacher incentive grants, which went to both K-12 and higher-
education. A summary of the Recovery Act allocations is available in Table 2.1.
The SFSF was by far the largest component of Recovery Act education funds. Of the
$53.6 billion in new funding, $48.3 billion was awarded to states to support public ele-
mentary, secondary, and higher education programs and services in their constituent school
districts. The remaining $5.3 billion was used by the Department of Education to make
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competitive grants through the “Race to the Top” and the “Invest in What Works and Inno-
vation” funds.3
Chakrabarti et al. (2013) study the impact of SFSF in New Jersey, and find that stimulus
funds were substituted in for declining state funding during the recession. Furthermore,
after SFSF funds were exhausted in 2011, total spending fell because state and local spend-
ing did not increase enough to make up for the loss of SFSF funds. Chakrabarti and Setren
(2015) use trend shift analysis to show that the federal stimulus offset declines in state and
local funding in New York State school districts in the 2009-2010 school year. As a result,
the recession did not strongly impact overall spending in the state. Bhalla et al. (2017)
compares the experiences of New York and New Jersey during the recession. They show
that New York was more successful than New Jersey in minimizing the impact of the Great
Recession. NJ experienced large cuts in state revenues which resulted in lower per-pupil
spending relative to NY in 2009 and 2010. Finally, Evans et al. (2017) studied the im-
pact of the Great Recession on U.S. schools, focusing on the SFSF. They find that the SFSF
caused decreases in state support for education, but had minimal effect on local support.
This meant that districts that were highly reliant on state funding were disproportionately
affected by the recession.
States were allowed to decide when to release the additional Title 1, IDEA special
education, and SFSF funds to school districts, as long as all the funds were distributed
by the end of Fiscal Year 2011. The SFSF, however, had relatively minimal conditions.
States were required to meet a Maintenance of Effort provision, which required states that
received SFSF funds to maintain K-12 and higher education spending at their 2006 level.
However, states could request waivers from this requirement, so this condition was very
easily met, or was nonbinding on the states.
2.3 Data and sample selection
To begin an analysis of how the Recovery Act funds affected state and local education
revenues, I first construct panel data on school district finances and demographics from
2005 to 2013, covering both pre- and post-implementation of the Recovery Act.
School district financial data is sourced from the National Center for Education (NCES)
Common Core’s Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey and the F-33
Local Education Agency (School District) Finance Survey, which together include informa-
tion on all U.S. school district finances, including charter schools and other special purpose
school districts. The Universe Survey data sets contain information on school district stu-
3U.S. Department of Education Law and Guidance Brief, 2012.
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dent characteristics like enrollment, race distribution, and students with special needs. The
F-33 data sets contain comprehensive information regarding school district budgets, and
sources of education revenue, including the amount that is received from various Federal
grant programs, states, and local districts.
In addition to the NCES, district information is also sourced from the Census’s Small
Area Income and Poverty Estimates (SAIPE), which has information on school district
poverty rates, and is available for years 1995 and later. These poverty measures are the
ones used by the Federal government to allocate Title 1 grants to school districts, and will
be used to construct the Title 1 element of the instrument described in the next section.
Finally, Recovery Act funding allocations are from the Department of Education’s pub-
lished reports (Garrison-Mogren and Gutmann (2012)). This data is only at the state level,
and is used primarily to create instrumental variables. Together, these data sets allow me
to construct panel data at the school district level for years 2005-2013.
I drop the top and bottom 1% of school districts according to total education spending
per pupil. This allows me to limit sensitivity to outliers in the data. I also drop all school
districts with fewer than 100 students, to limit sensitivity to changes in enrollment. This
approach is common in the education literature (Gordon (2004), Evans et al. (2017)). The
final sample consists of 111,061 district-year observations, covering all 50 states.
Table 2.2 contains summary statistics of the final sample. The columns correspond
to quintiles of per-pupil Recovery Act funds received by the district in years 2009-2011.
Districts that received more Recovery Act grants tend to have lower enrollment and higher
poverty rates. Their education budgets rely more on state and Federal education grants,
and less on local contributions. However, total education expenditure does not appear to
be correlated to the amount of Recovery Act grants received.
2.4 Estimation strategy
In this section, I describe the identification assumptions and the estimation strategy
used to identify the causal impact of increased Federal grants during the Great Recession
on state and local district education finance.
2.4.1 The relationship of interest






= β0 + β1∆2007
FCds,t
Pupilds,t
+ β2Xds,t + µs + νt + εds,t (2.1)
The variable Yds,t, represents one of three different measures of education finance:
state contributions, district contributions, or total education funds4 in district d, located in
state s at time t. The variable FCds,t represents Federal education contributions. Pupilds,t
is district enrollment, so that the outcome variables, Yds,t/Pupilds,t, and the treatment
variable, FCds,t/Pupilds,t, are in per-pupil terms.
Following the approach that is common in the education finance literature (Gordon
(2004), Bhalla et al. (2017)), I measure these variables as changes from the last year prior
to the beginning of the recession, 2007. This approach allows me to focus my analysis
on those changes driven by the ARRA. States also had significant discretion over when
stimulus funds were distributed to districts. This is because the Recovery Act funding
documentation records when states received Recovery Act funds but does not record when
state governments passed on these funds to the constituent districts, As a result, there is
a lot of state-level variation in timing: California and Illinois released funds to districts
immediately, while other states kept the fund to distribute later in the recession. By taking
differences of the outcome variable, I abstract from this timing issue, as well as control for
unobserved district-level fixed characteristics.
The estimation equation contains µs, a state fixed effect, which account for trends in
fiscal outcomes that are common to all districts in the state. It also includes νt, a year fixed
effect, which accounts for aggregate (time-series) trends.5 I also include Xds,t, which is a
vector of time-varying observable school district characteristics, including poverty share,
share of english language learners, median household income, and minority share. Do-
ing so allows me to account for changes in the fiscal outcomes that are due simply to
demographic changes like race or district incomes. Finally, εds,t is an error term.
The key parameter of interest is β1, which represents the effect of a $1 increase in
per-pupil Federal grants on the outcomes of interest. When the outcome is local or state
education contributions, then β1 = −1 is evidence of no flypaper effect or full crowd-out,
because an additional dollar of per-pupil Federal grants results in either the state or local
government reducing their contribution by exactly one dollar. On the other hand, if β1 = 0,
then there is evidence of complete flypaper effect or no crowd-out, because the additional
dollar in Federal grants has no impact on either state or local government funding and
therefore increases total education revenue dollar for dollar. When the outcome is total
4Total education funds is generally equal to the sum of state, district, and Federal education contributions.
5Estimates are robust to including a combined state×year fixed effect instead.
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contributions, generally β1,total = β1,state + β1,local + 1.6 Therefore, β1 = 0 represents no
flypaper effect/full crowd-out, while β1 = 1 represents complete flypaper effect/no crowd-
out.
A major threat to identification is the potential endogeneity of the amount of stimulus
grants received by the district. The β1 estimate can be interpreted as causal only if the
increase in Federal grants is exogenous to states’ and local districts’ education funding
decisions that are not accounted for by the other covariates. However, Federal grants are
potentially endogenous, either because of state discretion over ARRA grant allocations
(which may favor districts that also receive higher state funding), or because funds are
allocated competitively (which favors districts that are more likely to have higher spending
levels in the first place). Both cases lead to bias which favors finding a positive relationship
between Federal grants and state contributions and total revenue, respectively.
2.4.2 Instrumental variables
I address this endogeneity issue with instrumental variable estimation. I define three
instruments for the increase in Federal grants due to the implementation of ARRA. Two of
these instruments are related to expansions of the two major Federal grant programs, Title
1 grants and IDEA Special Education grants, while one instrument is related to the State
Fiscal Stabilization Fund, which was created with the Recovery Act.
2.4.2.1 Instruments for expansions of existing programs
Because Title 1 and IDEA special education grants are allocated according to formulas
that were determined prior to the beginning of the Great Recession, the size of these
types of grants received by a specific school district is independent of the school district’s
actions during the recession. The first two instruments are based on the formulas used to
determine these two grants.
The first instrument is based on Title 1 grants. The Recovery Act resulted in an addi-
tional $13 billion of Title 1 grants, which roughly doubled the pre-Recession size of the
Title 1 program.7 The rules regarding how Title 1 funds were allocated across districts
were unchanged by the Recovery Act.
6This is because total education contributions is the sum of state, local and Federal contributions. The “1”
on the right hand side represents the additional $1 of Federal grants.
7The Recovery Act also provided an additional $0.65 billion for Education Technology State grants, which
were created by the ESEA alongside Title 1 grants. Allocations to these programs are discretionary and are
not based on formulas, so this amount is excluded from the Title 1 instrument.
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I simulated a district’s share of the additional $13 billion in Title 1 grants to be propor-









× 13 billion (2.2)
where Povd,2007 is the number of children in poverty in 2007, the year before the Recovery
Act was implemented. Pov2007 is the total amount of number of children in poverty in
2007.
The second instrument is based on IDEA Special Education grants. IDEA grants are
grants to states: each state is allocated an amount equal to the amount it received in 1999.
Any appropriated funds over the 1999 amount are then distributed to states according to
child population and poverty rates. This formula was developed years before the start of
the recession and was unchanged by the passing of the Recovery Act.
I have data on the state-level allocations of additional ARRA IDEA funds. I abstract
from the complication of the formula that determines how states distribute IDEA funds,
and simulate a districts’s share of the IDEA funds available to the state as proportional to










where SpecEdd,2008 is the district’s population of students with special needs, and SpecEds,2008
the total number of students with special needs in the state. IDEAs,ARRA is the state’s al-
location of IDEA Special Education grants through the Recovery Act, as recorded by the
District of Education.
2.4.2.2 Instruments for new programs
The State Fiscal Stabilization Fund (“SFSF”) was a sizable new grant program intro-
duced by the Recovery Act. Similar to IDEA grants, states had discretion over how SFSF
funds were allocated within the state. As a result, it suffers from the same endogeneity
issue that IDEA grants suffer from, and cannot be used directly in a regression without
risking significant bias. Unlike IDEA grants, however, SFSF grants were not specifically
earmarked for a subpopulation of children served by the state’s schools and school dis-
tricts, so it is natural to use an instrument that is based on a district’s share of all state
contributions to education in that district’s state.
8An alternative specification of this instrument would be to define the district’s share of Title 1 funds as
proportional to the amount of Title 1 funds it received in the year before the Recession. The main results are
not sensitive to this specification.
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where SFd,2008 the amount of state funds received by the district in 2008, and SFs,2008 is
the total amount of state funds received by all districts in the state. SFSFs,ARRA is the
state’s share of all SFSF funds.
2.4.3 Two-stage least squares estimation
The instruments for IDEA and Title 1 are undefined when poverty (Title 1) or special
education (IDEA) information is not available for the district. By construction, the only
time the the SFSF instrument is undefined is when districts did not receive state funds in
2007. I limit my analysis to districts for which all instruments are defined. I use the three
instruments described in subsection 4.2 on the following 2SLS equation:
∆2007FCds,t = α0+α1Title1ds,t+α2IDEAds,t+α3SFSFds,t+δ1Xds,t+µ1,s+ν1,t+ε1,dst (2.5)
∆2007Yds,t = β0 + β1 ̂∆2007FCds,t + δ2Xds,t + µ2,s + ν2,t + ε2,ds,t (2.6)
Consider the first-stage estimation equation, (2.5). The left-hand side variable, ∆2007FCds,t,
is the potentially endogenous treatment variable in (3.2). I regress the change in Federal
education contributions on the three instruments plus state and year-specific fixed effects.
I then use the predicted change in Federal education contributions in the second stage,
(2.6), to calculate the unbiased causal effect of increased Federal contributions on the
outcome of interest.
This 2SLS approach allows me address the identification threats mentioned in sub-
section 4.1, because the instruments are “fixed” using pre-recession information, and are
plausibly exogenous to state and local districts’ fiscal decisions.9
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Effect of Federal stimulus funds on education finance
I analyze the effect of expanded federal grants on state and local education finance
using instrumental variable analysis.
9I formally test this statement in the Results section of this paper.
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2.5.1.1 The first stage relationship
In this subsection, I test whether the instruments described in subsection 2.4.2 are
valid instruments and are relevant to the time period of interest. In particular, I test
two hypotheses. First, relevance: the instruments must be related to changes in Federal
education revenue beginning in 2009, when the first Recovery Act funds were disbursed.
Furthermore, as a falsification test, the instruments should not have any predictive power
over changes in Federal education revenue prior to 2008.
Consider the cross-section coefficient estimates of α in the following regression:
∆2007FCds = α0 + α1Title1ds,t + α2IDEAds,t + α3SFSFds,t + δXds + µs + εds, (2.7)
where FCds is the endogenous variable, Federal contributions to education received by the
district. The right hand side of the equation includes the three instruments defined in the
earlier section.
When the instruments are are predictive of the dependent variable, the α estimate
should be statistically significant, and not otherwise. Since the Recovery Act funds were
only disbursed beginning in 2009, I expect that estimates for years 2008 and earlier will
be insignificant, and significant for years past 2009. Because the dependent variable is
defined to be changes from 2007, the 2007 estimate is 0 by construction.
The α estimates are presented in Figure 2.3, where the lines through each point rep-
resent the 95% confidence interval around these estimates. As predicted, all the instru-
ments have no explanatory power prior to 2008. The estimates are positive beginning in
2009, but it is not statistically significant for the IDEA and SFSF instruments, while it is
marginally significant for the Title 1 instrument.
Between 2009 and 2011, all the estimates are statistically significantly different from
0, which indicates that the instruments are explaining at least some part of the observed
changes in Federal contributions received by the district. This coincides with when the
ARRA funds were distributed to districts. The Title 1 and IDEA instruments continue to
have explanatory power after 2011, but the SFSF instrument does not.
Table 2.3 summarizes the regression results for (2.5), the first stage equation, for the
years 2009-2011. To differentiate the effect of each instrument on the endogenous vari-
able, I show five specifications of the first stage containing different combinations of the
three program instruments. The first three columns include one program instrument, to
capture the impact of each of the instruments on the endogenous variable, the change in
Federal grants received by the district, in isolation.
Column 4 contains only the instruments that are associated with pre-existing Federal
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grant programs. Column 5 contains all three program instruments, and is my preferred
specification. The first stage has an F-statistic of 26.42, so there are no concerns of finite
sample bias.
2.5.1.2 Second-stage estimates
Table 2.4 describes the effects of the increased Federal grants during the Great Re-
cession on district-level fiscal outcomes. I present three models, each corresponding to
a different outcome variable: local revenue, state revenue, and total education revenue
respectively. The first row contains the OLS estimates, and the second row contains the
two-stage least squares estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses, and clustered at the
district level. I focus my discussion on the IV (“2SLS”) estimates.
Consider the first column, where local revenue is the outcome under consideration.
The OLS and IV estimates both agree that the additional Federal grants resulted in higher
local education contributions. That is, an additional dollar of Federal grants induced the
district to contribute $0.09 and $0.46 more toward education (“crowd-in”) for the OLS
and 2SLS models, respectively. Furthermore, the magnitude of the OLS estimate is smaller
than the IV estimate, which is consistent with bias resulting from Recovery Act funds being
targeted to districts that have lower ability to raise local funding.
The second column has state revenue as the outcome variable. The OLS estimate is
insignificant, while the IV estimate implies that an additional dollar of Federal grants re-
sulted in $0.41 less state revenue, but the estimate is also not statistically significant. This
is clear evidence of crowding out, since the state contributed less to education when Fed-
eral grants increased. The difference between the OLS and IV estimates is consistent with
districts that rely less on state contributions receiving fewer Recovery Act funds.
Finally, the third column has total revenues as the outcome variable. The OLS and 2SLS
estimates are similar and indistinguishable from 1. Because β1,total = β1,state + β1,local + 1,
this indicates that there is little crowd-out at the level of total revenues. It appears that
the crowding-in of local revenues is almost exactly offset by the crowding-out of state
revenues. Ultimately, there is significant flypaper effect, and these additional Federal
funds are not crowded-out at the total revenue level. Indeed, there is evidence of mi-
nor crowding-in of about $0.04 for every dollar granted, but this effect is not statistically
significant.
The different effects of additional Federal grants at the state of local level is likely due
to a variety of reasons, one of which is the fact that state and local education revenues
are often earmarked for different types of school expenditures. Consider, for example,
the case when local education revenue is used to fund instruction and teacher’s salaries.
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If a school district receives an additional $100 per student education grant that is spent
to offer new classes or on a new building, then it may be necessary for the local district
to pay for additional teachers to teach these classes or for utilities for the new building.
This additional expense would appear as crowding-in Federal revenue. On the other hand,
if state spending has fewer such restrictions, then it is less likely for such crowding-in
patterns to appear, and I would be more likely to observe the standard crowding-out of
Federal funds.
2.5.2 Decomposition of results: existing vs. new programs
To explore earmarking as a potential explanation of the causal estimates calculated
in the previous subsection, I consider a categorization of the Recovery Act funds. Recall
that the Recovery Act funds were channeled through either expansions of existing grant
programs (Title 1 grants and IDEA special education grants) or through a new program
created by the Recovery Act (SFSF). Title 1 and IDEA special education grants are for spe-
cific purposes–to support students in poverty or need special education accommodations.
On the other hand, the SFSF was created by the Recovery Act specifically to help stabilize
state and local budgets to ensure that spending on education would not drop drastically
during the Great Recession.
Because Title 1 and IDEA special education grant programs are more narrowly targeted,
I expect to observe that expansions of these programs will tend to stick. The SFSF, which
has less restrictions, is expected to be more likely to get crowded out. I test whether the
program through which the additional Recovery Act funds were distributed matters for the
rate of crowd-out. Consider the following 2SLS estimation:
∆2007OldGrantsds,t = α0old + α1oldTitle1ds,t + α2oldIDEAds,t + α3oldSFSFds,t
+δ1oldXds,t + µold,s + νold,t + εold,ds,t
(2.8)
∆2007NewGrantsds,t = α0new + α1newTitle1ds,t + α2newIDEAds,t + α3newSFSFds,t
+δ1newXds,t + µnew,s + νnew,t + εnew,ds,t
(2.9)
∆2007Yds,t = β0+βold ̂∆2007OldGrantsds,t+βnew ̂∆2007NewGrantsds,t+δ2Xds,t+µ2,s+ν2,t+ε2,ds,t
(2.10)
There are two endogenous variables in the above equations. The first endogenous
variable, OldGrantsds,t, represents existing Federal grants, which is defined as the sum
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of the district’s actual receipt of Title 1 and Idea Special Ed grants in year t (“existing
grants”, or “old grants”). The second endogenous variable, NewGrantsds,t is defined as the
difference between the change in total Federal grants and Vds,t (“new grants”). I regress
these two endogenous variables on the three program instruments.
Because of how the endogenous variables are defined, mathematically the estimates of
the effect of all grants, β1 in equation (2.6), will lie somewhere between βold and βnew.
To illustrate this, consider the following example, where the outcome variable is total
education revenue. A school district receives $100 per student in additional Federal grants,
$25 of which is through Title 1 or IDEA special education, and the remaining $75 from
other grants. Then the effect of the additional $100 in Federal grants on the school district’s
own education effort will be a weighted average of the effect of old and new grants:
β1 = 0.25× βold + 0.75× βnew
2.5.2.1 First-stage estimates
In this subsection, I perform a similar exercise to that in subsection 2.5.1.1, and explore
how the instruments relate to the endogenous variables. Figure 2.4 contains cross-section
estimates of α in equation (2.8) by year, so the endogenous variable under consideration
is the change in the total Title 1 and IDEA Special Education grants received by the school
district relative to 2007 (“existing grants”). Because 2007 is the basis year, the estimate for
2007 is zero by construction. There appears to be a secular trend in the relationship be-
tween all three program instruments and the endogenous variable prior to the recession, as
evidenced by the positive estimate for 2005. This is likely due to the fact that the formulas
for awarding Title 1 and IDEA grants are unchanged during the analysis period. However,
the bias is fairly small: maximum size is about .15. The most powerful instrument for this
endogenous variable is the Title 1 instrument, followed by the IDEA instrument. These
two instruments together explain about $0.85 of every dollar granted. The Stabilization
Fund instrument has much lower explanatory power, and in fact has no explanatory power
outside of 2010, where it explains about $0.05, however the confidence intervals are large.
Figure 2.5 contains cross-section estimates of α in equation (2.9) by year, so the en-
dogenous variable under consideration is the change in Federal grants received by the
school district relative to 2007 that are not accounted for by the Title 1 and IDEA Spe-
cial Education grants (“new grants”). Similar to Figure 2.4, the coefficient for 2007 is 0
by construction. All three instruments have no predictive power over the receipt on new
grants prior to 2009 and after 2011, which coincides with when the Recovery Act funds
were distributed. The Stabilization Fund and Title 1 instruments have the most explana-
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tory power in 2009-2011, combining to explain approximately $0.80 per dollar granted
in 2010. The IDEA Special Education instrument explains some of the grants, but the
confidence intervals are large so it is difficult to conclude anything about its year-on-year
impact.
Table 2.5 contains the first stage regression results. Consistent with the earlier two
figures, the Title 1 and IDEA instruments have the most explanatory power over existing
grants (that is, the sum of actual Title 1 and IDEA Special Education grants received by
the district), while the Stabilization Fund instrument has the most explanatory power over
new grants (that is, Federal grants other than the existing grants). The F-statistics for
existing and new grants are 26.06 and 25.61, respectively, so there are no concerns of
finite sample bias.
2.5.2.2 Second-stage estimates
Table 2.6 reports the second-stage decomposition estimates of equation 2.10. Each col-
umn is a unique regression, where the figures in the first and second row are βold and βnew
respectively. There are three sets of results, each corresponding to a different outcome.
I now focus on the IV estimates in my discussion. First, I discuss the effects of expanding
existing grants like Title 1 and IDEA Special Education grants. These are reported in the
first row of Table 2.6. I find some evidence that expansions of both existing and new
grants crowd in local and state education contributions. However, these estimates are not
statistically significantly different from zero. I also find that an additional dollar of Title
1 or IDEA Special Education grants result in about $1.65 more total education revenue.
This is consistent with a full flypaper effect, and with a 95% confidence allows a crowd-out
effect of at most 40%.
I attribute this finding to the fact that Title 1 and IDEA Special Education grants are
established Federal grant programs and it is likely that state or local district policy-makers
have minimal influence over the distribution of these grants. Furthermore, I observe some
evidence of crowding-in of funds at both the state and local district level, consistent with
the lack of flexibility and the need for supplementary spending on the behalf of the state
and local school district to support Title 1 and IDEA initiatives.
Second, I discuss the effects of expanding new grants. Unlike Title 1 and IDEA special
education, these new grants, of which the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund is a significant
portion, are not targeted towards specific sub-populations of students. States receive these
grants and have the flexibility to distribute them to their constituent school districts. Fur-
thermore, after receiving these grants from the parent state government, school districts
are not required to spend the grants on specific programs. Hence, these grants are very
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close to “lump sum” grants.
The other key difference between these new grants and Title 1 and IDEA special edu-
cation grants is that these new grants are not just new, they were also explicitly temporary.
The Recovery Act allocated $48.3 billion through the SFSF, and states were mandated
to give these funds to school districts within two years. Title 1 and IDEA special educa-
tion grants, one the other hand, were historically Federal grant programs and expected to
continue after these two years.
The βnew estimates are reported in the second row of Table 2.6. Of note here is the
significant difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates in the regressions for State
Revenue and Total Revenue. When the dependent variable is State Revenue, as in columns
(3) and (4), the OLS estimate is insignificant while the 2SLS estimate is statistically sig-
nificantly negative. When the dependent variable is Total Revenue, I find that the OLS
estimate for new grants is statistically significant and positive, but the 2SLS estimate is not
statistically different from zero. A reason why we observe this pattern is that unpredictable
portions of the Recovery Act funds are gong to districts that would have had unusually high
education spending levels anyway during that time period. Hence, using the OLS method
leads me to estimate a positive relationship between the additional new grants and Total
Revenue. However, using an IV approach allows me to reduce this bias, and allows me to
capture the true relationship between these variables.
I find that an additional dollar of new grants has no impact on local contributions. This
effect is precisely estimated, and I am able to conclude that expansions of these new grants
do not crowd-out local contributions. On the other hand, I also that state governments
reduce their education contributions by $1.12 for every additional dollar of new grants.
This indicates that states completely crowd out new Federal grants. Finally, I find that the
additional dollar of new grants is completely offset by the decrease in state funds. That
is, the new grants acted to relieve state governments but allowed no tax relief to local
districts. This finding is consistent with Evans et al. (2017), who in their study of the State
Fiscal Stabilization Fund also found these grants completely crowded-out.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effect of expanded Federal education contributions during the
period of the Great Recession on school district-level K-12 education finance. Through the
ARRA, Federal education revenue increased by almost 50%, from approximately $850 to
$1300 per pupil in the average school district. The ARRA funds were allocated to districts
in on of two ways: expanding existing Federal education programs like Title 1 or IDEA Spe-
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cial Education grants, or through a new program, the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund. This
natural experiment allows me to study whether the anti-recession measure introduced by
the government with the Recovery Act was able to achieve the goal of stabilizing education
budgets in school districts across the US.
My paper has two major contributions. First, I analyze a temporary increase in Federal
education contributions, in contrast to earlier papers like Gordon (2004) who analyzed
permanent increases of Federal contributions though the introduction of new programs. I
am also able to shed light on the flypaper effect, a long-studied empirical puzzle.
My results suggest that the program through which the ARRA funds were distributed
had a huge impact on the flypaper effect of these funds. Funds channeled through ex-
pansions of existing grants were not crowded-out at the state or local level, resulting in
a dollar for dollar increase in district-level total education revenue. On the other hand,
funds that were channeled through the SFSF were completely crowded out at the state
level, so that district-level total education revenue was unchanged.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Time series of the share of K-12 education revenues by source
This figure shows that approximately 45% of total K-12 education funding is raised by state
governments, and a roughly equal amount is from local governments, while about 9% comes from
the Federal government. These shares have remained fairly constant over time, outside of an
increase in Federal funds beginning in the Great Recession, marked by the vertical red line.
65
Figure 2.2: Trends in per-pupil revenue during the Great Recession
This figure shows how education revenues changed around the time of the Great Recession,
marked by the vertical red line. All values are in per-pupil terms and in 2009 dollars. Federal
per-pupil revenue increases sharply after 2008, and stays high for a few years before decreasing
back to its pre-2008 level. State per-pupil education revenues decrease after 2008 and remain low
in the years following. Local per-pupil revenues are relatively unchanged compared to Federal and
state revenues.
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Figure 2.3: Effect of program instruments on Federal grants by year
Each point is the cross-section α estimate of the effect of each of the instruments on the
endogenous y-variable, described by equation (2.7). The variable on the y-axis represents the
change in per-pupil Federal grants received by the district relative to 2007. By construction, the α
estimates for 2007 is 0. The instruments have no effect prior to 2009, which makes sense because
the ARRA was only passed in 2009. After 2009 to 2013, the instruments have predictive power.
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Figure 2.4: Effect of program instruments on existing (old) Federal grants by year
Each point is the cross-section α estimate of the effect of each of the instruments on the
endogenous y-variable, described by equation (2.8). The variable on the y-axis represents the
change in per-pupil Title 1 and IDEA Special Education grants (“existing grants”) received by the
district relative to 2007. By construction, the α estimate for 2007 is 0. There appears to be a
secular trend prior to the implementation of the Recovery Act. The Title 1 and IDEA instruments
explain about $0.80 per dollar granted, while the Stabilization Fund instrument has no
explanatory power outside of 2010, where it explains about $0.05, but the confidence intervals
are large.
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Figure 2.5: Effect of program instruments on new Federal grants by year
Each point is the cross-section α estimate of the effect of each of the instruments on the
endogenous y-variable, described by equation (2.9). The variable on the y-axis represents the
change in per-pupil Federal grants received by the district relative to 2007 that are not accounted
for by Title 1 or IDEA Special Education grants (“new grants”). By construction, the α estimate for
2007 is 0. The instruments have no explanatory power over the size of new grants prior to 2009.
In 2009 and 2010, the Title 1 and Stabilization Fund instruments both explain about $0.30 per
dollar granted. The IDEA instrument is weaker, but this may have to do with collinearity.
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2.8 Tables
Table 2.1: Allocation of Recovery Act education funds
Program Amount
Title 1 grants to local education agencies $13 billion
(includes targeted, incentive, and school improvement grants)
IDEA special education grants $12.2 billion
State Fiscal Stabilization Fund $53.6 billion
Other education grants $19.4 billion
(including Federal Pell grants)
The table above shows the amount of Recovery Act education funds that went to each of
the three largest Recovery Act programs.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics by quintile of recovery grants received
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lowest Quintile Highest Quintile
Federal contributions 762.4 1023.4 1233.5 1492.1 2141.0
(466.2) (639.0) (600.4) (886.1) (1702.7)
Poverty rate 0.0992 0.140 0.177 0.210 0.260
(0.0590) (0.0663) (0.0709) (0.0801) (0.101)
Share Special Ed 0.120 0.128 0.134 0.141 0.154
(0.0347) (0.0370) (0.0434) (0.0506) (0.0577)
Share English Language Learners 0.0413 0.0411 0.0415 0.0405 0.0395
(0.0757) (0.0826) (0.0886) (0.0928) (0.0941)
State contributions 3527.2 5066.9 5573.2 5963.0 6954.4
(1676.5) (1676.0) (1617.3) (1779.8) (2523.0)
Local contributions 8550.2 5364.0 4462.7 4000.7 3907.5
(4421.0) (3053.6) (2730.0) (2462.5) (2658.8)
Total expenditure 11391.7 10173.5 10158.9 10396.7 11815.5
(3379.0) (2406.0) (2372.3) (2422.8) (3396.8)
Enrollment 5264.1 4947.5 3963.9 3137.4 2773.4
(13005.3) (14210.7) (10797.8) (9187.1) (17929.4)
Observations 6258 6257 6258 6257 6257
This table contains summary statistics of the final sample, and the unit of observation is the school district. School districts are grouped
into quintiles of the amount of Recovery Act funds received. High grant districts received more state and Federal education
contributions, and rely less on local grants. These districts also tend to have lower enrollments and higher poverty rates. There is no
obvious relationship between total education revenue and receipt of Recovery Act funds. All fiscal variables are in per-pupil terms, and
denominated in 2009 dollars.
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Table 2.3: First stage regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Federal grants Federal grants Federal grants Federal grants Federal grants
Title 1 0.704∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗
(0.0780) (0.0812) (0.0868)
IDEA Special Ed 0.849∗∗∗ 0.488∗∗∗ 0.278∗
(0.146) (0.144) (0.136)
Stabilization fund 0.439∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(0.0406) (0.0417)
Observations 31287 31287 31287 31287 31287
District and Time FEs X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X
F 28.14 20.47 23.81 25.91 26.42
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table contains coefficient estimates of the first stage regression equation (2.5), using the instruments described in Section 4.
Demographic controls include including poverty share, share of English language learners, median household income, and minority
share. The unit of observation is the school district, and standard errors are clustered at the school district level. All fiscal variables are
in per-pupil terms and denominated in 2009 dollars. The first column shows the effect of the Title 1 instrument on the change in
Federal grants, when it is the only instrument used. Similarly column 2 and 3 show the effect of the IDEA instrument and the SFSF
instrument, respectively. Column 4 is the effect of both permanent program instruments, while column 5 contains all instruments. My
preferred specification is the one in column 5. All instruments appear to be powerful, with F-statistics larger than 20.
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Table 2.4: Effect of (all) Federal grants
(1) (2) (3)
Local Revenue State Revenue Total Revenue
OLS 0.0910∗∗∗ 0.00252 1.094∗∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0258) (0.0373)
2SLS 0.458∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗ 1.046∗∗∗
(0.129) (0.185) (0.172)
Observations 31287 31287 31287
District and Time FEs X X X
Demographic Controls X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This is from the second stage regression equation (2.6). Demographic controls include including
poverty share, share of English language learners, median household income, and minority share.
The unit of observation is the school district, and standard errors are clustered at the school
district level. All fiscal variables are in per-pupil terms and denominated in 2009 dollars. Each cell
represents a distinct regression. The dependent variable is indicated at the top of the column, and
the rows correspond to the OLS and two-stage least squares estimates, respectively.
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Table 2.5: First stage estimates of decomposition
(1) (2)
Existing Grants New Grants
Title 1 0.356∗∗∗ 0.0904
(0.0378) (0.0872)
IDEA Special Ed 0.170∗∗ 0.108
(0.0575) (0.128)
Stabilization Fund 0.0217 0.307∗∗∗
(0.0120) (0.0416)
Observations 31287 31287
District and Time FEs X X
Demographic Controls X X
F 26.06 25.61
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table contains coefficient estimates of the first stage regression, when there are two
endogenous variables, existing (old) and new grants. Demographic controls include including
poverty share, share of English language learners, median household income, and minority share.
The unit of observation is the school district, and standard errors are clustered at the school
district level. All fiscal variables are in per-pupil terms and denominated in 2009 dollars. The first
column shows the effect of all three instruments on the change in the receipt of existing grants,
defined as the sum of Title 1 and IDEA grants. Only the Title 1 and IDEA instruments have
predictive power over this variable. The second column shows the effect of all three instruments
on the change in new grants, defined as all Federal grants that are not accounted for by Title 1 or
IDEA grants. For this variable, only the SFSF instrument has predictive power.
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Table 2.6: Second stage estimates of decomposition
Local revenue State revenue Total revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Existing Grants 0.256∗∗∗ 0.521 0.343∗∗∗ 0.127 1.599∗∗∗ 1.647∗∗∗
(0.0635) (0.405) (0.0546) (0.173) (0.0842) (0.527)
New Grants 0.0688∗∗∗ 0.057 -0.0432 -1.118∗∗∗ 1.026∗∗∗ -0.061
(0.0184) (0.426) (0.0254) (0.471) (0.0337) (0.432)
Observations 31287 31287 31287 31287 31287 31287
District and Time FEs X X X X X X
Demographic Controls X X X X X X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This is from the second stage regression. Demographic controls include including poverty share, share of English language learners,
median household income, and minority share. The unit of observation is the school district, and standard errors are clustered at the
school district level. All fiscal variables are in per-pupil terms and denominated in 2009 dollars. Each column is a distinct regression,
which are grouped by the dependent variable in the regression. I report both OLS and 2SLS estimates for each dependent variable.
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CHAPTER III
State Finance Systems and Crowding-out by State
Contributions to Education
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I investigate the crowding out of increased state education contributions
on total education spending1 at the school district level. I explore the extent to which this
effect depends on the properties of the state finance system in the district’s state. Specif-
ically, I use an event-study framework to analyze year-on-year changes in state contribu-
tions to a district and the resulting changes in the district’s education effort for different
state finance system properties.
In the United States, the responsibility of funding K-12 public education falls primarily
to state and local governments, and on average, districts receive about the same amount
of funds from the state government and from the district’s own tax effort. Together, these
two sources of funds provide 90% of the average district’s K-12 budget, with the remaining
10% coming from Federal sources.2
Despite the equality of state and local contributions at the aggregate level, a particular
district’s reliance on state and local funds is highly variable across states. Consider figure
3.2, which shows the variation in per-pupil state education revenue for the sample districts
for Fiscal Year 2012. At the low end, school districts in Utah received $6,432 per pupil on
average in state aid, but school district in New York received $19,529.3
This variation in contributions is driven by differences in state education finance sys-
tems, which describes the mechanism through which education revenues are raised and
1In my analysis, total contributions are the same as total spending, and I use these terms interchange-
ably.This is because in my primary dataset, the F-33 LEA Finance Survey, school districts report their spending
and the source of their funds for the fiscal year. For the school districts in the sample, the sum of funds from
all sources is equal to total spending.
2National Center of Education Statistics (“NCES”) Digest of Education Statistics.
3NCES Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elementary and Secondary Education, Fiscal Year 2012.
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how these funds are shared between school districts within a state. A state finance systems
is a set of rules that describe how states and local school districts share the responsibility
for funding K-12 education. Generally, state governments are responsible for designing the
state education finance system and choosing the properties that characterize them. Local
school districts have no authority to select these on their own.
I argue that the design of state finance systems has significant implications on the extent
of crowding-out of education funds by state education contributions, and therefore, sig-
nificant fiscal policy implications. This paper relates to the literature on school finance re-
form and spending (Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997), Murray et al. (1998), Hoxby (2001),
Card and Payne (2002), and Downes and Shah (2006)), but takes an alternative approach
where school finance systems are characterized by their properties. In this framework,
school finance reform occurs when finance systems add or remove properties from their
existing state finance system.
This paper has two key contributions. First, I establish the relationship between prop-
erties of the state education finance system and the level of crowding out of education
funds by state contributions. Second, I show that the different crowd-out rates implied by
these properties explain why increased state involvement can lead to both increased and
decreased total spending in different school districts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a short overview of
the development of state finance systems. In section 3.3 I discuss the characterization of
state finance systems according to their properties. Section 3.4 describes the data used in
this analysis. In section 3.5 I discuss my identification strategy. In section 3.6 I describe
my findings and discuss results. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 A brief history of state finance systems and reforms
Prior to 1970, funds for education were primarily raised at the local district level
through property taxes, and as a result the amount of funds available to districts was
heavily dependent on local property values. This meant that areas with high property
values consistently had more money to spend relative to areas with low property values,
leading to large within-state differences in per-pupil spending.
Since 1970, states have reformed their education finance systems to move to more
across-district redistributive education grants where the state takes on some responsibility
for education funding.4 Some of these movements have been the result of state supreme
4This started with the landmark Serrano v. Priest (“Serrano”) decision, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), which
concerned the constitutionality of the large spending disparities between California school districts.
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courts have overturning school finance systems(Jackson et al. (2015)), and some the result
of state undergone legislative reform to change how schools are funded. A stated goal of
many state finance reforms is reducing inequality of education spending within the state,
and common theme that emerges from the literature is that when state finance systems
are reformed, total spending changes. However, evidence on whether these reforms have
led to increases in education spending is mixed. While these reforms change the relative
size of state education contributions within the state, they do not necessarily lead to corre-
sponding changes in total education contributions, because local districts can reduce local
effort in response to increased state aid. That is, if local contributions decrease by more
than the increase in state contributions, the ultimate outcome is lower overall education
funds.
Several papers find that increased state involvement leads to higher total spending.
Murray et al. (1998) find that court-ordered education finance reforms that led to more
state involvement between 1971 and 1996 have led to decreases in inequality by raising
spending in the poorest districts and leaving the richest districts unchanged. Baicker and
Gordon (2006) show that school finance reforms between 1980 and 2000 have largely led
to higher spending per pupil and less inequality across the state.
Other papers find that increased state contributions leads to lower total spending. Fer-
nandez and Rogerson (1998) show that when California moved to a pure state funding
formula in the 1970s, education spending became more equal across districts but overall
spending dropped 10-15%. Guryan (2001) uses the passing of the Massachusetts Educa-
tion Reform Act in 1993 as a natural experiment to analyze how extending state control
of education funding affects total per-pupil expenditures. He finds that an additional dol-
lar of state government education spending only increases total per-pupil expenditure by
only $0.50 - $0.75. Similarly, Card and Payne (2002) find that school finance reforms lead
to more equal total per-pupil expenditure within states. They calculate that a $1 dollar
increase in state aid to districts resulted only in a $0.50-$0.65 increase in total district
spending.
Later papers show a more nuanced result, that reforms that emphasize equalization
may result in lower total spending (“leveling down”) or higher total spending (“leveling
up”) even as spending across districts within a state becomes more equal. Hoxby (2001)
argues that different types of education finance systems imply different costs of providing
public education, and that the difference in costs is responsible for whether an equalization
reform leads to leveling up or leveling down. Jackson et al. (2014) show that equity-based
reforms have no effect on total spending, while reforms that are adequacy-based increase
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spending.5
I take an alternative approach to the state finance reform literature by characterizing
school finance reforms by states adopting or removing a particular property from its exist-
ing state finance system. The crowd-out rates I measure here are important for a variety
of reasons. The crowd-out rates are informative to address important policy questions like
whether fiscal stimulus for the state government in the form of additional education con-
tributions is an efficient way to raise education spending. This would certainly be the case
in states with state finance systems whose properties indicate low levels of crowding out,
or even crowding-in, but not in states where crowding-out rates are high.
3.3 Properties of state education finance systems
In this section, I discuss the different properties of state finance systems used in this
analysis and describe the theoretical crowd-out rates implied by each one. The properties I
use are an adaptation of those developed in Card and Payne (2002) and refined in Jackson
et al. (2014). The state finance properties described below have very different implications
on the ability and incentives for the local school districts to raise funds for education.




(Federal contribution + State contribution
+Local base× Local tax rate) (3.1)
Total contribution is the total amount of funds that were contributed toward educa-
tion in the school district. Federal and state contributions are the portions was granted
by the Federal and state governments respectively. Local contributions to education are
determined as the product of the local tax rate and the local tax base, and is the portion of
education funds that is paid for by residents of the school district itself.
The variable n is the number of students enrolled in the district, so the above equation
represents the total amount of funds available to the local school district in per-pupil terms.
To simplify the notation, let T be Total contribution, S be State contribution, B be the Local
base, and t be the tax rate.
T = F + S + tB
The first property is a minimum foundation plan (MFP), which was used by 39 states
5Equity-based reforms are aimed at reducing intrastate inequality in total spending. Adequacy-based
reforms are those that are aimed at achieving a sufficient level of education funding in all districts, regardless
of equity concerns.
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in 2012. A minimum foundation plan acts to ensure a minimum spending level in every
district in the state. States award the difference between education revenues raised by
the district and the minimum spending level (“foundation level”) specified by the foun-
dation plan. That is, if the state sets the foundation level at X per pupil, and school
district A contributes Y , then the amount of state contributions for school district A is
SA = max{0, X − Y }, and the amount of local contributions is tABA = Y . Note that this
implies that low-tax base districts, contribute less to education, and will receive more state
funds. However, high-tax base districts are unchanged.
The crowd-out rate implied by MFP within a state is a direct consequence of the choice
of X and Y . If states are increasing contributions, it must be that X −Y is increasing. The
first possibility is that this is due to an increase in the foundation level (which affects all
districts in the state). Consider that the foundation level increases from X to X ′. Absent
any other responses from the local district,
∆Total contribution =∆Federal contribution + ∆State contribution + ∆Local contribution
=∆State contribution
= max{0, X ′ − Y } −max{0, X − Y }
=1
Therefore, in a state with MFP, an increase in state spending solely due to an increase in
the foundation level theoretically results in no crowding-out of state funds, because a $1
increase in state funds increases total revenue by exactly $1.
The second possibility is that the foundation level has not changed. Then any changes
in local contributions induced by changes in the level of state contributions will be solely
due to the crowd-out effect.
The second property is an equalization plan (EP),6 which was used in 36 states in
2012. An equalization plan is generally aimed at eliminating spending differences due to
different tax bases by providing state funds to school districts according the local tax base.
For example, states can guarantee the same tax revenue to every district with the same tax
rate. This can be implemented by allowing tax rates to generate the same revenue across
all school districts regardless of the local base.
Consider two school districts where property values are different, A < B, but have the
6Hoxby (2001) calls these power equalization plans.
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same tax rate, t. Then following (3.1), we have
SA + tA = SB + tB
SA = SB + t(B− A)
That is, low-tax base districts receive more state funds than high-tax base districts to make
up for the lower tax base.
Note that the equalization plan formula does not specify how much states fund educa-
tion, only that districts that perform the same tax effort receive the same amount from the
state. Hence an increase in state funding does not necessarily imply increases or decreases
in total education contributions.
The next property is a reward-for-effort plan (RE), where a state awards more state aid
to school districts with higher tax rates. A common form of RE is matching grants. Note
that RE requires that states give more funds to high-tax base districts, in contrast to EP,
where low-tax base districts receive more funds.
The final property is a spending limit (SL), which imposes a maximum amount of total
education spending. SL is not a property that is used on its own, but instead is one that
is used in combination with another property. In a state that is using SL, increased state
aid to a district will theoretically decrease education funds from all other sources one to
one, if total spending is already at the maximum level specified by the education finance
system. This type of finance system decreases inequality by limiting spending in wealthy
districts to below the limit.
Jackson et al. (2014)’s categorization of state finance properties include two more prop-
erties that I exclude in my analysis. The first is flat revenue grants (FG), where states give
a fixed amount of aid to each constituent district on a per-pupil basis. That is, all school
districts receive some amount, regardless of the local tax base. This means that there is
no variation in state contributions and no information to measure the crowd-out rate as-
sociated with FG. Finally, there is full state funding (FS), where the parent state takes on
all the responsibility for funding public education. Because I am interested in studying the
interaction between state and local contributions to education, I exclude FS in my analysis
as it also provides no information.7
To see how these properties are used to characterize school finance reforms, consider
California and the Serrano court case decision8, which legislated a reduction of within-
state education spending inequalities by instituting a limit to education spending in all
7As a robustness check, I perform the same analysis with FS and FG included. The estimates are not
sensitive to this change.
8Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976). I use this case to illustrate my results in Section 3.6
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California school districts. This reform would be characterized as going from the old state
finance system (old SFS) to old SFS + spending limit. A list of Supreme Court rulings on
state finance systems from 1967-2010 is available in Jackson et al. (2014).
Table 3.1 shows which states had education finance systems with particular properties
as of 2012. Many states use a combination of two (or more) properties, and these states
appear multiple times in the table. Figure 3.1 shows how the popularity of these different
properties has changed over time. The number of states using a particular state finance
property has remained flat between 2002 and 2012. In fact, between 2000 and 2010, 40
states do not change their education finance system.9
In order to get a sense of which state finance properties are likely to be used together,
Table 3.2 lists the combinations of state finance properties in use for Fiscal Year 2012.
Eleven states have state finance systems that can be described as having only one of the
properties described earlier in this section. The modal combination of state finance prop-
erties is MFP and EP, with thirteen states using that combination. An additional 16 states
use MFP and EP in combination with one or more of the other properties. RE is only used
in combination with other state finance properties.
3.4 Data
In this section I discuss the data and the identification strategy in my analysis, and
the underlying assumptions. The primary approach used in this analysis is an event study
framework that utilizes changing state finance systems to identify the impact of the finance
system on the crowding-out rates.
3.4.1 Data and sample selection
School district data is primarily sourced from the National Center for Education (NCES)
Common Core’s Local Education Agency (School District) Universe Survey and the F-33
Local Education Agency (School District) Finance Survey, which together include informa-
tion on all U.S. school district finances, including charter schools and other special purpose
school districts. The Universe Survey data sets contain information on some school district
student characteristics like enrollment, race distribution, and students with special needs.
The F-33 data sets contain comprehensive information regarding school district budgets
9This does not mean that the school finance systems in these states were unchallenged in this 11-year
time span. One possibility is that any court cases brought in these states to reform the school finance system
were either unsuccessful or the characteristics of the school finance systems were unchanged according to
the five school finance properties.
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and sources of education revenue, including the amount that is derived from property
taxes, sales taxes, and so on.
My analysis focuses on the years 2002-2012. School districts in Montana, New Hamp-
shire, and Vermont are excluded because these states report information for primary and
secondary schools separately, even when these schools are in the same school district. The
analysis also excludes Washington, D.C., which is not a U.S. state. To limit sensitivity of
results to outliers, I drop the top and bottom 1% of school districts in terms of per-pupil
total revenue. Many of these “outlier” school districts are outliers because of possible data
entry error, where the budgets recorded are so large or so small to be unrealistic.
I also only consider school districts with more than 100 enrolled students, so that the
data is less sensitive to year-on-year changes in district enrollment. This also allows me to
exclude administrative school districts, who enroll no students but receive funds from the
Federal and state governments. The final sample consists of 103,205 school district-year
observations, covering 47 U.S. states.
3.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive sample statistics are reported in Table 3.3. Districts in states that use
reward-to-effort plans are larger (high enrollment) than those in states that use state fi-
nance systems with other properties.
All fiscal variables are reported in per-pupil terms. Federal per-pupil contributions
are roughly equal across all state finance properties. Local contributions are higher for
districts in states that use MFP and EP, and lower for those in states that use SL and RE.
Total expenditure generally reflects the patterns of local contributions. Most importantly
for this analysis, state per-pupil contributions do not appear to be significantly different
across state finance properties.
3.5 Estimation strategy
My empirical approach to estimate the effect of various school finance system properties
on the crowding-out rates of state contributions on contributions from other sources relies
on an event study framework, which requires that school finance reforms are plausibly
random. That is, states that do not reform their finance systems in a particular year are
good counterfactuals for states that do. The baseline estimation equation is the following:
NSsd,t = β0 +
∑
j
φj,sd,t [β1,j + β2,jSCsd,t] +X
′
sd,tδ + γt + εsd,t (3.2)
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The dependent variable is the amount of per-pupil revenue from all sources other than
the state government received by the school district sd at time t. The amount of per-pupil
state aid received by the district is given by SCsd,t. φj,sd,t is an indicator for the education
finance system used by the state which the school district belongs to having property j.
I also control for a set of time-varying district characteristics,Xsd,t. These characteristics
include the share of black students, share of Hispanic students, poverty rate, and share of
students that have special needs. I also include controls for the age distribution, specifically
the share of school-age children living in the district. Finally, to account for contribution
changes due to macroeconomic effects, I include a time trend. All fiscal variables are in
2012 dollars.
The coefficients of interest are the β2,j ’s. This coefficient is an estimate of the effect
of a $1 increase in state aid for a district on total revenue from non-state sources when
the education finance system in the school district’s state has property j. Because NSsd,t
is the sum of education spending from all non-state sources, a $1 increase in state contri-
butions increases contributions from other sources by β2,j. This means that when β2,j is 0
or greater, then there is no crowding-out by state funds. Instead, increased state contri-
butions increases contributions from other sources. When β2,j is less than 0, then there is
crowding-out, and an additional dollar of state funding decreases contributions from all
other sources.
The difference between the β2,j ’s indicates the relative crowding-out rates implied by
each state finance system property. For states using finance systems with multiple proper-
ties, the net effect of an extra $1 of state contributions on total funding is the sum of all
relevant β2,j ’s. For example, Alabama used a school finance system with two properties
in 2002: minimum foundation plan and equalization plan. Then if a district in Alabama
received an extra $1 of state funds, total education revenue from non-state sources in the
district increases by
β2,MFP + β2,EP .
When β2,MFP + β2,EP is positive, then this is crowding-in of funds, so that additional state
contributions increases total education revenue by β2,MFP +β2,EP . When β2,MFP +β2,EP is
negative, then state funds are crowded out.
To the extent that the effect of having multiple state finance properties is not addi-
tive, I also perform the above estimation where I assign each state into a state finance
system group according to the combination of properties of its state finance system. So,
for example, because Alabama, Colorado, and Connecticut all have state finance systems
characterized by a minimum foundation plan and an equalization plan, they are placed
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into the same state finance system group. I then perform the following regression:
NSsd,t = β0 +
∑
j
φk,sd,t [β1,k + β2,kSCsd,t] +X
′
sd,tδ + γt + εsd,t (3.3)
Unlike equation (3.2), the index k here corresponds to a state finance group. Because
all states are assigned into at least one group, the estimates of (3.3) will have one omitted
group. The omitted group is the modal state finance group.10 Comparisons between the
estimates derived using (3.2) and (3.3) will be done by referring to this omitted group.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 A visual analysis
Figure 3.3 looks directly at the relationship between state education revenue and local
education revenue in 2012 for each state finance property. For each property, districts are
separated into deciles of per-pupil state revenue. State, local, and total education revenue
is averaged within each decile. That is, consider the first panel of Figure 3.3. The red
line traces out the relationship between mean state revenue (in the x-axis) and mean local
district revenue (in the y-axis) for each decile of districts. Similarly, the blue line traces the
relationship between mean state revenue and total revenue.
Several patterns are clear in this figure. First, the shape of the relationship between
state revenue and other sources of revenue are similar across state finance properties. This
is likely due to the high rate of overlap between the school finance properties (Figure 3.1).
Next, at low levels of state per-pupil contributions, districts contribute more locally to
education, resulting in a high total revenues in these districts. As states increase their
contributions, local contributions are crowded out, but at different rates in states with
different state finance properties.
School districts that receive higher amounts of state education funds contribute less of
their own funds on average. At a sufficiently high level of state contributions (at roughly
the median state contribution level), local contributions reach a minimum level and are
no longer crowded-out. This means that the decrease in local contributions are large for
low levels of state contributions, but flat at high levels of state contributions. At that point
total education revenues increase dollar for dollar with state contributions.
Critically for this analysis, there are differences across state finance properties. This is
most obvious in levels: the top decile of school districts in states that use MFP or EP (in
10This is the group where the school finance system uses exactly two properties: minimum foundation
plan and equalization plan. See Table 3.1 for Fiscal Year 2012.
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the top panels of figure 3.3, respectively) receive much more state contributions than the
top decile of districts in states the use SP or RE. Because the mean state contribution levels
are roughly equal across state finance properties, this implies that the variance of state
contributions is higher for districts in states that use MFP or EP.
Furthermore, the rate at which state contributions are crowded out is visually different
across state finance properties. Districts in states that use a reward-for-effort plan (lower
right panel) appear to crowd-out state contributions much faster than those in states that
do not, as evidenced by a steeper red line at low levels of state contributions.
In the rest of this section, I empirically measure how much of the crowd-out rates are
attributable to the state’s choice of state finance systems. I describe how crowding-out
rates differ across different state finance properties. I start with the estimation strategy
described in (3.2) and (3.3), and report two sets of results. The first are based on cross-
sectional data and show how the crowd-out rates have changed over time. The second use
panel data and are estimates of the crowd-out rates using an event study framework.
3.6.2 Crowd-out rates over time
In this section, I analyze how crowd-out rates by state finance property have changed
over time. I also show that the differences between state finance properties persist over
the period of analysis, and are just not an artifact of chance.
Table 3.4 shows the cross-section estimates of β2,j in (3.2). The lines through the
estimate represent 95% confidence intervals around the estimate. From this graph, it is
clear that crowd-out rates are very different between state finance properties even in the
cross-section.
Districts in states that use a minimum foundation plan have crowd-in rates of about
40 cents per dollar prior to 2008, but after 2009, additional state education contributions
crowd-out funds from all other sources by about 20 cents per dollar.
In states that use an equalization plan, I find evidence that additional state educa-
tion contributions are crowded-out consistently over the time period of analysis, by about
25 cents for every additional dollar from the state government. However, the estimated
crowd-out rates are not statistically significantly different from zero in 2009, 2011, and
2012.
In states that use reward-for-effort plans, I see evidence of crowding out of about 15
cents for every additional dollar of state education contributions. This estimated crowding-
out rate is fairly consistent across the time period of analysis. Finally, districts in states that
instituted spending limits, I see some evidence of crowding in, but for the most part funds
from non-state sources are unaffected by additional state funds.
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The Great Recession started at about the same time as (i) the shift from crowding-in
to crowding out for MFP, and (ii) the loss of significance of the crowding-out estimates
for EP. Because of this confounding factor, this phenomenon is difficult to interpret. This
finding motivates event-study analysis using panel data, which allows me to account for
large government-wide shifts by controlling for time trends. Furthermore, states adopting
or removing properties from its existing state finance property aids in this identification.
3.6.3 Event study analysis
In this subsection, I analyze the crowd-out rates of state education contributions on
contributions from all other sources and how how these rates depend on properties of the
education finance system used by the state. To aid in interpreting these estimates, consider
the case of California, first mentioned in Section 3.3. Serrano v. Priest constituted of three
California Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s. The court ruled that property tax rates
and per pupil expenditures should be equalized across the state, and the difference in the
revenue limits per pupil were mandated to be less than $100. The California legislature
responded to Serrano by passing a bill designed to equalize school revenues by putting a
cap on per-pupil revenues in wealthy districts.
In the characterization of reforms in this paper, California moved from a state finance
system with a minimum foundation plan (“MFP”) to a state finance system with a minimum
foundation plan and spending limits (“MFP + SL”). There are two ways to think about this
reform. The first is to think of California adding the property ”SL”, and the impact of this
addition on the crowd-out rate in the state is estimated in subsection 3.6.3.1. The second
way is that California changed state finance property groups (MFP→ MFP + SL), and the
impact of this change on the crowd-out rate in the state is estimated in subsection 3.6.3.2.
3.6.3.1 Crowd-out rates by school finance property
In this section, I present my results of the crowd-out rate of funding from all other
sources by state contributions to education, when state finance properties are considered
individually. These are estimates of β2,j ’s where the j can be either “MFP”, “EP”, “RE”, or
“SL.”
Table 3.4 contains these estimates. The dependent variable in these regressions is
per-pupil contributions to education from all sources other than education. Each of the
columns represents a separate regression, where I add, successively, state dummies, year
dummies, and state × year dummies. My preferred specification is in column 4.
I find the states whose education finance systems contain the MFP property have the
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highest crowd-in rates, so that an additional dollar of state contributions to education
cause local and Federal sources to increase their joint contribution by 14 cents. In states
that have instituted spending limits, SL, the crowd-in rate is lower but still positive: 10
cents for every additional dollar of state contributions.
On the other hand, equalization plans and reward-for-effort plans result in state con-
tributions crowding out education funds from all other sources. The property that implies
the highest crowding-out rate is EP, equalization plans. A state with an education finance
system that has the EP property has state contributions crowding out funds from all other
sources by 19 cents for every dollar. Similarly, there is evidence that states which use a
reward-for-effort plan, RE, see crowd-out rates of 12 cents for every additional dollar of
state contributions.
Because some states use combinations of properties in their state finance system, it is
important to think about what combinations of state finance properties imply regarding
crowd-out rates. Because MFP and SL both result in crowding-in of funds, the crowd-
in effect is reinforced by these two properties. Therefore, in states with both properties I
observe crowding in of 24 cents for every additional dollar of state contributions. Similarly,
EP and RE together imply a crowd-out rate of 31 cents for every additional dollar of state
contributions. However, the combinations “MFP+SL” and “EP+RE” are only used by two
states each.
The remaining states use combinations of properties where one implies a crowd-in of
funds, while the other implies a crowding-out of funds. In these cases, the combination
of properties result in a crowd-out rate that is not statistically significantly different from
0. In other words, for these combination of properties, the crowd-in and crowd-out effects
offset each other, so that education revenue from all sources increases dollar for dollar
with state contributions.
3.6.3.2 Crowd-out rates by property group
The discussion in the previous subsection carries the assumption that the effect of the
different state finance properties is additive. In this subsection, I relax this assumption and
analyze how different combinations of state finance properties affect the crowd-out rate.
I present my results of the crowd-out rate of funding from all other sources by state
contributions to education, when state finance systems are categorized into state finance
property groups. These groups are defined according to their specific combination of state
finance properties. For example, all states that use MFP and EP in their state finance system
are grouped together into the“MFP + EP” group, and so on. A table of the different state
finance groups, and the size of each is available in Table 3.2.
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The estimation equation is (3.3), where the “k”s correspond to a state finance group.
The dependent variable is per-pupil funds from non-state sources. The β2,k’s represent the
impact of additional state contributions on the dependent variable when the school district
is in a state in finance property group k. A state finance reform that changes the properties
of the state’s education finance system would be represented by a state moving between
state finance groups.
Table 3.5 contains these estimates. The dependent variable in these regressions is per-
pupil contributions to education from all sources other than education. The omitted group
is “MFP+EP,” which is also the modal state finance group. The estimates in table 3.5
should be interpreted as relative to this omitted group. Each of the columns represents a
separate regression, where I add, successively, state dummies, year dummies, and state ×
year dummies. My preferred specification is in column 4.
Beginning from the omitted group, “MFP + EP,” we can estimate what the effect of
adding or removing a state finance property on the crowd-out rate. The estimate for “MFP
+ EP + RE” is -0.26, which means that adding the reward-for-effort property resulted
in the crowding out of 26 cents of non-state funding for every additional dollar of state
education contributions. Similarly, the coefficient estimate for the property group “MFP +
EP + SL” is 0.211, so adding a spending limit resulted in a crowd-in rate of 21 cents for
every additional dollar.
One can also work backwards to calculate crowd-out rates for adding the minimum
foundation plan and equalization plan properties. The coefficient estimate for the group
“MFP” is .267, which means that adding the EP property resulted in a crowding-out of 26
cents for every additional dollar of state contributions. Finally, the coefficient estimate for
“EP” is -.402, so adding the MFP property resulted in a crowd-in rate of 40 cents for every
additional dollar.
Although the estimates of crowd-out rates when adopting or removing a state finance
property are not identical to the estimates in the previous subsection, this does not nec-
essarily mean that the effect of these state finance properties are likely not to be additive.
The estimates based on state finance groups are consistent in terms of the relative ordering
of crowd-out/crowd-in rates.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the effect of increased state contributions to public education
on the amount of funds from all other sources received by the school district. I perform an
event study analysis where state finance reforms are characterized by adopting or remov-
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ing a state finance property. I calculate how the rate of crowding out of education funds
from all other sources by state contributions depends on the properties of the state finance
system adopted by the district’s state.
This analysis helps address important policy questions debated as states move toward
higher centralization of public education finance. As states increase their involvement in
education funding, in order to fully understand the impact of increasing state contributions
it is important to know how funding at the local district level is affected. This paper
provides evidence that the minimum foundation plan property results in the lowest crowd-
out rate–in fact, adoption of the MFP property implied that education contributions are
crowded in by state funding. Similarly, a spending limit resulted in the crowding-in of
funds. On the other hand, equalization plans and reward-for-effort plans resulted in the
crowding out of education funds.
The findings of this paper are indicative that this alternative approach of characterizing
state educational finance reforms as the adopting or removing of a state finance property
is very promising. I use two different parametrizations of the impact of state finance
properties on the effect of adding or removing a state finance property on the crowding-
out rate of all other education funds by state contributions to education, and find that the
different properties imply different things about the crowd-out rate of state contributions.




Figure 3.1: State finance properties over time
The figure above shows how many states use a particular state finance property between
2002 and 2012. Overall, the popularity of different state finance properties has remained
fairly flat over the time period of interest.
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Figure 3.2: States and properties of the educational finance system, 2012
The figure above shows the mean level of state education revenue in each U.S. state for
Fiscal Year 2012. State revenue levels are highly variable across states.
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Figure 3.3: State revenues by source and state finance property
This figure shows the relationship between state education revenues, local revenues, and
total education revenues, by state education finance property. The construction of this
graph is described in section 3.4. All values are in per-pupil terms.
93
Figure 3.4: Crowd-out rates over time
The figure above shows how the coefficient β2,j has changed over time. It is clear that the
value of β2, j are different when j, the state finance property, is different. Furthermore,
these differences persist over the sample period.
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3.9 Tables
Table 3.1: States and funding formula types, 2012
State Funding System Property States
Minimum Foundation Plan (MFP) AL, AK, AR , AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA,
MN, MS, MT, MO, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD,
TN, TX, UT, VA, WY, WV
Equalization Plan (EP) AL, AK, AR , AZ, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA, IL, IN, KS, LA, MD, ME, MI,
MT, MO, NC, ND, NE, NH, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OK, OR, PA, RI, TX,
UT, VA, WA, WI, WV
Reward-for-effort (RE) AZ, FL, GA KS, KY, MD, ME, MO, MS, ND, PA, SC, TX, VA, MD, ME,
WA, WI, WV
Spending Limits (SL) AR, AZ, CA, HI, IA, ID, KS, MI, MT, NE, NH, OR, TX, VT, WA, WY
The table above contains the four most popular properties of state finance systems and
the states that use them. With MFP, the state guarantees a minimum level of per-pupil
spending in the districts.
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States often use education finance systems with multiple properties. The above is a a
frequency table of the different combinations of state finance properties used by U.S.
states in 2012. MFP=minimum foundation plan, EP=equalization plan, SL=spending
limit, RE=reward-for-effort plan. For completeness, the table about includes one more
state finance property that I do not use in my analysis, as it is a characteristic of only one
state’s education finance system: FS=full state funding. This is the property of Hawaii’s
education finance system, which has a single school district.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics by state finance property
(1) (2) (3) (4)
MFP EP RE SL
Enrollment 3904.6 3667.8 4692.6 3902.5
(13376.8) (11638.5) (13949.6) (13864.3)
Federal contributions 1068.4 1027.2 1176.2 1085.7
(990.7) (951.4) (970.1) (1044.9)
State contributions 5313.6 5459.5 5242.5 5411.7
(2500.5) (2594.8) (2022.3) (2214.0)
Local contributions 5612.3 5909.2 4860.9 4661.7
(4088.3) (4226.7) (3244.1) (3326.2)
Total expenditure 10786.6 11212.1 10194.4 9925.6
(3611.6) (3718.3) (2600.3) (2573.2)
Observations 87358 81267 33906 37939
The above are summary statistics of the estimation sample. All fiscal variables are in
per-pupil terms, and denominated in 2009 dollars. The state finance property appears
uncorrelated with student enrollment, federal education contributions, or total education
expenditure. Critically, the level of state contributions is fairly equal across these four
properties of state finance systems, so that the crowd-out rates calculated in this paper
have the same distributional base.
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State contributions 0.286∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗
(0.0347) (0.0479) (0.0510)
MFP X State contributions 0.151∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0375) (0.0402)
EP X State contributions -0.170∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗
(0.0370) (0.0418) (0.0447)
RE X State contributions -0.120∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗
(0.0362) (0.0363) (0.0383)
SL X State contributions 0.103∗∗ 0.0922∗ 0.102∗
(0.0384) (0.0388) (0.0410)
Observations 103205 103205 103205
State dummies X X
Year dummies X
State × year dummies X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table contains the β2,j estimates of equation (3.2), where the j’s correspond to the different state finance properties. All
fiscal variables are in per-pupil terms, and denominated in 2009 dollars. The dependent variable is total education revenue
from sources other than the state. Each column is a unique regression specification, with different combinations of fixed
effects indicated by the bottom 3 rows of the table. My preferred specification is Column 4. I find that different state finance
properties have different crowd-out rates. I calculate a crowd-in rate of 14 cents for MFP, which means that school districts
in a state that adopted MFP will see higher total education spending by about $1.14, with $1 from the state and 14 cents
from other sources. On the other extreme, I calculate a crowd-out rate of 19 cents for EP, so that school districts in a state
will only spend and additional $0.81 for every dollar of state funds received.
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Per-pupil state contributions 0.299∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(0.00609) (0.00610) (0.00616)
EP -0.371∗∗∗ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.402∗∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0159)
EP+RE -0.434∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.433∗∗∗
(0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0220)
EP+SL -0.388∗∗∗ -0.373∗∗∗ -0.412∗∗∗
(0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0278)
EP+RE+SL 0.839∗∗∗ 0.837∗∗∗ 0.863∗∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0268) (0.0268)
MFP 0.248∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0196)
MFP+RE 0.332∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0525) (0.0559)
MFP+SL 0.169∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0148)
MFP+EP+RE -0.211∗∗∗ -0.207∗∗∗ -0.261∗∗∗
(0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0184)
MFP+EP+SL 0.198∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0179)
MFP+EP+RE+SL -0.219∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0140)
Observations 103205 103205 103205
State dummies X X
Year dummies X
State × year dummies X
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
This table contains the β2,j estimates of equation (3.3), where the k’s correspond to the
different state finance property groups. All fiscal variables are in per-pupil terms, and
denominated in 2009 dollars. The dependent variable is total education revenue from
sources other than the state. The interpretation of the estimates here are similar to that of
Table 3.4. Unlike in Table 3.4, school districts are categorized into state finance property
groups. Hence, all school districts which are in states that use MFP and EP are
categorized into the “MFP + EP” group.
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